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LABOR INJUNCTION IN MINNESOTA
THE LABOR INJUNCTION IN MINNESOTA
By BEN CHERNOV*
I. INTRODUCTION
A LTHOUGH labor unions have travelled far from the point in
the first part of the nineteenth century where they were
held to be criminal conspiracies, the exact status of labor's rights
under the present state and federal statutes is still uncertain. The
shift in attack on labor has been from criminal indictments brought
by the government to injunctions at the suit of a private individual.
The purpose of the recent statutory labor legislation' has been
an attempt to regulate the weapon of the injunction.
The purpose of this paper is to endeavor to trace the role
of the labor injunction in Minnesota through its various stages,
including the present statutory era, to the end of trying to predict
its function in labor disputes today.
II. EARLY CASES AND STATUTES
Although involving interference with advantageous business
relations rather than labor disputes, three early Minnesota cases
have been of basic importance to the development of the use of
the injunction in labor disputes.2
In Bohn Manufacturing Co. v. Hollis,3 an association of
retail lumber dealers, pursuant to its laws, wds about to stop
dealing with plaintiff wholesaler, Nyho had sold directly to a
customer in a vicinity where a member retailer was doing busi-
ness. The order granting the injunction was reversed on appeal,
*Fourih year law student, University of Minnesota.
'Act of March 23, 1932, ch. 90, 47 Stat. at L. 70, 29 U. S. C. A. 101-115,
2 Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 29, sec. 101-115 (Norris-La Guardia Act);
Minn. Laws 1933, ch. 416, Mason's Minn. Stat., 1940 Supp., sees. 4260-1-
4260-15 (Minnesota Labor Disputes Injunction Act). Several other states
have passed similar laws. For more complete discussion, see infra, p. 774 ff.2The court has often decided the particular controversy before it as
being within the rule of one of the above cases. Thus in Tuttle v. Buck,
(1909) 107 Minn. 145, 119 N. W. 946, 22 L. R. A. (N.S.) 599, 16 Ann.
Cas. 807, the court refused to apply the rule of the Bohn Case, (1893) 54
Minn. 223, 55 N. W. 1119, 21 L. R. A. 337, 40 Am. St. Rep. 319, that an
act otherwise lawful is not unlawful because of its motive, to the facts in
that case. In Gray v. Building Trades Council, (1903) 91 Minn. 171, 97
N. W. 663, 1118, the court distinguished the Bohn Case, saying that in the
former case there had been no pressure on third persons.
3(1893) 54 Minn. 223, 55 N. W. 1119, 21 L. R. A. 337, 40 Am. St.
Rep. 319.
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and the court held that since the purpose was lawful, the fact
that several had combined to effect the purpose could make no
difference, since "the number who unite to do an act cannot
change its character from lawful to unlawful." The court
further declared that it was not unlawful for a person, or group
of persons, to refuse to work, or as in the present case, to refuse
to deal with any man or class of men as he sees fit. 4 Furthermore
the court held that a bad motive could not make a lawful act un-
lawful.
In the case of Ertz v. Produce Exchange of Minneapolis,5
plaintiff brought an action for damages against an association
of produce men for interference with his business. The associa-
tion's demurrer to the complaint was overruled, and on appeal
judgment was affirmed. The complaint alleged that the de-
fendants had no legitimate interest to protect in agreeing and
conspiring not to sell to the plaintiff, and in conspiring to induce
customers of the plaintiff to cease dealing with him by inform-
ing them that the plaintiff could no longer obtain goods. The
court distinguished the Bohn Case saying (a) that here defendants
had a malicious purpose, since they had no legitimate interest to
protect, and (b) that here the acts of the defendants extended
to inducing third persons 7 not to deal with the plaintiff, and
therefore the defendants' acts were unlawful.8
In Tuttle v. Buck,' the plaintiff alleged in his complaint that
the defendant banker had opened up a barber shop for the ex-
press purpose of ruining the plaintiff's business and that the
defendant did this solely out of malice toward the plaintiff. The
trial court overruled defendant's demurrer, and on appeal judg-
4The court relied on two old cases, Commonwealth v. Hunt, (1842)
4 Met. (Mass.) 111; Mogul Steamship Co. v. MacGregor, (1888) 21 Q. B.
Div. 544.
5 (1900) 79 Minn. 140, 81 N. W. 7.37, 48 L. R. A. 90, 79 Am. St. Rep. 433.6The court pointed out that in the Bohn Case the retail lumber dealers
were justified in trying to prevent a wholesaler from obtaining their business.
7The court also pointed out that in the Bohn Case, (1893) 54 Minn. 223,
55 N. W. 1119, 21 L. R. A. 337, 40 Am. St. Rep. 319, the pressure brought to
bear on the plaintiff was only by the association and even so, each retailer
member was free to deal with the plaintiff and drop out of the association.
sThe court is actually drawing a distinction between an agreement not
to deal with a certain person by the parties interested (a primary boycott)
and an agreement to induce third persons also not to deal with him (a secondary
boycott), and holding the former to be lawful and the latter unlawful. For
discussion, see (1917) 1 MINNESOTA LAw REvIE 437.
9(1909) 107 Minn. 145, 119 N. V. 946, 22 L. R. A. (N.S.) 599, 16
Ann. Cas. 807. Here, as in the Ertz Case, (1900) 79 Minn. 140, 81 N. W.
737, 48 L. R. A. 90, 79 Am. St. Rep. 433, the action was at law for damages
and not in equity for an injunction.
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ment was affirmed. The court held that although an act taken by
itself may be lawful, nevertheless when inspired by a bad motive
it becomes an actionable tort. The court indicated a desire to
limit the rule as stated in the Bohn Case, saying:
"It is not at all correct to say that the motive with which an
act is done is always immaterial, providing the act itself is not
unlawful," and further adding that "We are not able to accept
without limitations the doctrine [announced in Bohn Case] above
referred to. .. ."
There have been several Minnesota decisions dealing with in-
terference with contracts of employment, as distinguished from
the cases already discussed dealing with interference with plain-
tiff's business and advantageous relationships. In an early case'
a statute1' making it a misdemeanor for any employer to blacklist
a former employee or in any way to "prevent, hinder, or restrain"
such a person from obtaining employment elsewhere, was held
valid against an objection that it was class legislation and in viola-
tion of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment,
since it applied equally to all employers. Another provision"
of the same statute making it a misdemeanor for two or more
employers to agree, combine, or agree to combine for the pur-
pose of preventing any person from getting employment by
means of threat, promises, blacklists, etc., was given effect in two
cases."' The actions under this statute have been at law for
damages. The question whether it would be a defense to a suit
for an injunction that the act sought to be enjoined was also a
crime was not considered in any of the above cases. In a later'4
case, arising under a different criminal statute,15 it would seem
that this fact would have made no difference. 1
6
There are several Minnesota cases dealing with interference
"oState ex rel. Scheffer v. Justus, (1902) 85 Minn. 279, 88 N. W. 759.
"1Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 10378-next to the last sentence.
12Ibid., third sentence.
"Joyce v. Great Northern Ry., (1907) 100 Minn. 225, 110 N. W. 975;
Carnes v. St. Paul Union Stockyards Co., (1925) 164 Minn. 457, 205 N. W.
630, discussed in (1926) 10 MINNESOTA LAw REVIEW 448. This is clearly
so if there is an existing contract relationship, (1917) 2 MINESOTA LAW
REVIEW 71; (1921) 6 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 58; (1923) 7 MINNESOTA
LAW REvEw 254; (1928) 12 MINNESOTA LAw REVIEW 162. And the same
is true if there is merely the prevention of the formation of a contract,
Carnes v. St. Paul Union Stockyards Co., (1925) 164 Minn. 457, 205 N. W.
630. See discussion in (1928) 12 MINNESOTA LAW REvmlw 162.14Campbell v. Motion Picture Machine Operators Union of Mpls.,(1922) 151 Minn. 220, 227, 186 N. W. 781. See infra, pp. 767, 769.
"Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 10463.
16Fitchette v. Taylor, (1934) 191 Minn. 582, 584, 254 N. W. 910 is to the
same effect.
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with contracts of employment not within the scope of the above
mentioned statute.17  There is another statute"" which prohibits
any person, corporation, firm, or agent or employee thereof, from
discharging any employee or preventing employment from being
obtained by reason of such person having engaged in a strike.
Likewise it is provided that no person shall be required as a
condition of obtaining employment to state his record or conduct
in a previous strike. 0  No case has ever arisen under these
statutes.
"Yellow dog contracts" were subject to early legislation20 in
this state. A yellow dog contract is an agreement exacted of an
employee or one seeking employment whereby, as a condition of
obtaining or retaining work, the employee agrees not to join any
labor organization, and in the event that he does, that he will
withdraw from employment. Such a contract when coupled with
the injunction to prevent its breach is a powerful weapon against
labor.21 In State v. Daniels2 it was held that such contracts could
not be prohibited by any legislative enactment, and that in so
far as the Minnesota statute had this effect, it was void. The
court based its holding upon a decision by the United States
Supreme Court"2 in so far as24 that court held that a similar
statute enacted by Congress violated the liberty of contract of
employers under the fifth amendment. 25 Two' 6 further attempts
17For complete discussion see Note (1928) 12 MINNESOTA LAW R E-
VIEW 162.
'SMason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 4201. Compare Act of July 5, 1935,
ch. 117, 46 Stat. at L. 1084, tit. 29, secs. 158-3, 29 U. S. C. A. sec. 158-3, 2
Mason's U. S. C., tit. 29, sec. 158-3; National Labor Relations Board v.
Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., (1938) 304 U. S. 333, 58 Sup. Ct. 904, 82 L. Ed.
1381.
19Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 4202.2OMason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 10378, first sentence.
"2Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, (1917) 245 U. S. 229, 38
Sup. Ct. 65, 62 L. Ed. 260; Taylor, Labor Problems and Labor Law (1938)
186, 191; Doskow, Yellow Dog Contracts, (1931) 17 Am. B. A. J. 516.
"2(1912) 118 Minn. 155, 136 N. W. 584.
"3Adair v. United States, (1908) 208 U. S. 161, 28 Sup. Ct. 277, 52
L. Ed. 436, 13 Ann. Cas. 764.
-4Defendant Adair was indicted on two counts, (1) unlawful discrimi-
nation against an employee because of union membership, and (2) unlawful
threatening of an employee with loss cf employment. In State v. Daniels,
(1912) 118 Minn. 155, 136 N. W. 584, the Minnesota court said that the
question of threat and coercion had not been decided in the Adair Case,
(1908) 208 U. S. 161, 28 Sup. Ct. 277, 52 L. Ed. 436, 13 Ann. Cas. 764, and
that the question was still open in Minnesota. The court pointed out that
coercion may exist under Mason's 19Z.7 Minn. Stat. sec. 10431 as well as
under Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat. sec. 10378, but that no such facts were shown
here.
"5By the same reasoning the state statute is a violation of the em-
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to prohibit yellow dog contracts have been made by the Min-
nesota legislature. The courts are not in accord in deciding the
problem of when a contract relationship exists between an em-
ployer and employee27 so that an attempt to organize employees
will amount to a breach of such contract. 28
Before treating the cases involving labor injunctions, it may
be well to point out the effects of an injunction and a temporary
restraining order on the activities of organized labor. Since the
temporary restraining order is usually issued ex parte on the
basis of affidavits of the applicant, the effect is often to place a
check on practically all activities" of labor until a motion for a
temporary injunction may be heard, unless the restraining order
by its terms has expired prior to such time. As has been pointed
out,"' the effect of this is disastrous to organized labor, since
it stops the strike before it has started, and since it creates pub-
lic opinion against the strikers. Such criticism can no longer be
applied to Minnesota courts, since the matter is now governed by
statute. 1  The temporary injunction 2 may have a like effect on
labor but usually will be more just, since both parties have been
beard.
A case of basic importance in Minnesota labor law is Gray v.
Building Trades Council.33 Defendant union, in an effort to force
plaintiffs, electrical contractors who employed non-union men,
to accede to its demands, resorted among other things to the
practice 4 of threatening labor trouble to persons for whom plain-
ployer's liberty of contract under the fourteenth amendment.26Minn. Laws 1933, ch. 416, p. 777, Mason's Minn. Stat., 1940 Supp.,
sec. 4260-3; Minn. Laws 1939, ch. 440, pp. 990, 992, secs. 10(a) and 12(c),
Mason's Minn. Stat., 1940 Supp., secs. 4254-30(a), 4254-32(c).27See complete discussion in (1933) 17 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 228.
The New York rule is discussed in Note, (1927) 12 MINNESOTA LAW
REVIEW 812
sCf. Currier & Sons v. International Moulders' Union, (1921) 93
N. J. Eq. 61, 115 AtI. 66. Also Interborough Rapid Transit Co. v. Lavin,(1928) 247 N. Y. 65, 159 N. E. 863.2
"At least the restraining order may be as broad as the applicant de-
sires to have it, assuming he has affidavits in support thereof. Naturally
the exact scope of such orders will vary with the particular case.10Witte, The Federal Anti-Injunction Act, (1932) 16 MINNESOTA LAW
RE~VEW 638, 653; Frankfurter and Greene, The Labor Injunction, (1930)
200. 2 lMason's Minn. Stat., 1940 Supp., sec. 4260-7-8, (The Minnesota Labor
Disputes Injunction Act) ; Minn. Laws 1939, ch. 440, p. 993, sec. 14, Mason's
Minn. Stat., 1940 Supp., sec. 4254-34.IlMost appeals taken to the Minnesota supreme court have been from
motions refusing to dissolve temporary injunctions.
21(1903) 91 Minn. 171, 97 N. W. 663, 1118.
34The facts showed that defendant had caused the cancellation of two
existing contracts of plaintiffs at which they were working, and had pre-
vented the formation of a third contract.
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tiffs worked if the plaintiffs were continued on the job. A broad
injunction granted by the trial court was modified on appeal and
sustained as modified. The court recognized that a strike to obtain
better wages or- otherwise better conditions is lawful, although
there may be a resulting injury to plaintiffs, citing Bohn Manu-
facturing Co. v. Hollis. But the court felt the facts before it to
be such as to make the acts of the defendants unlawful and a
boycott, and therefore enjoinable as a conspiracy.8 5 The court,
after holding the Bohn Case inapplicable to the facts, distinguished
it from the Ertz Case on the ground that the former did not involve
any pressure on third persons and so was not a boycott.3 6
The injunction of the trial court was divided into three parts:
(1) it enjoined the defendants from interfering with plaintiffs'
business through the use of threats or intimidation of any kind
against the customers or prospective customers of plaintiffs;
(2) the same as (1), and in addition enjoined defendants from
notifying customers or prospective customers that plaintiffs were
unfair; and (3) the defendants were enjoined from entering the
premises where the plaintiffs were employed for the purpose of
interfering with plaintiffs' business, and to that end, from direct-
ing or notifying members of allied unions at work thereon to
desist from work upon the said oremises because of the fact that
plaintiffs were employed there. On appeal it was held that the
first section merely restrained a boycott,T and was therefore
proper. The second section was held too broad, in so far as it
prohibited defendants from notifying plaintiffs' customers or
prospective customers that plaintiffs were unfair. Whether or
not a notification that plaintiffs are "unfair" involves a threat
or intimidation so as to be within the first section was disposed of
by the court on the ground that the findings based on the com-
plaint did not support such a conclusion. The court further left the
35 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 10055-(5) would seem applicable; still
it was not applied by the court. See infra, footnote 51 and text.36The court defined a boycott as being "a combination of several persons
to cause a loss to a third person by causing others against their will to with-
draw from him their beneficial business intercourse through threats that,
unless a compliance with their demands be made, the persons forming the
combination will cause loss or injury to him; or an organization formed to
exclude a person from business relations with others by persuasion, intimida-
tion, and other acts, which tend to violence, and thereby cause him through
fear of resulting injury to submit to dictation in the management of his
affairs." The first part of the definition (italics added) was applied to the
defendants in the case. The latter part of the definition seems never to have
been applied in any case.
37It is obvious that the Minnesota court uses "boycott" in the sense of
a secondary boycott. See supra, footnote 8.
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question open by saying that such a question can be decided only
"from all the facts and circumstances of each particular case." 38
The third section was likewise modified by the court to allow
the defendants and their agents to refuse to deal with the plaintiffs
and for that purpose to persuade members and associates to cease
work and join their union. Defendants were allowed further to
enter the premises where plaintiffs were at work to effect the
above purpose, if. it were done with the consent of the owner of
the premises.
In Scott Stafford Opera House Co. v. Minneapolis Musicians
Associatin 30 plaintiff sought to enjoin the enforcement of a
union rule by which no union member would play for plaintiff
unless a certain number of union men were hired. The plaintiff
alleged that it did not require so many musicians, that it had no
dispute with any of the musicians, and that if the rule were enforced
it would be unable to get any other musicians and therefore would
be unable to conduct its performance. A demurrer to the com-
plaint was sustained, and on appeal the order was affirmed, the
court finding that the rule was beneficial to the members, that the
purpose was lawful, and that the defendants could refuse to work
for whomever they saw fit.40 As a result of this case it was at
one time questioned whether there was any limit to the extent to
which a union could pursue its purposes.4 1  On a similar state of
facts, a Massachusetts court had held directly to the contrary. 42
In a sequel to the Gray Case, the Minnesota court in Grant
Construction Co. v. St. Paul Building Trades Counci 4 3 was again
faced with the troublesome problem of the point at which the
activities of a union cease to be lawful and become a secondary
boycott.44 A motion for a temporary injunction pending trial
was refused, and on appeal the order was affirmed. The court
stated that for purposes of review it must take the view of the
38The court indicated that there could be intimidation without threats
of violence to either person or property. Such a guide is uncertain, and the
question was again left unanswered by Hallam, J. in the Steffes Case, (1917)
136 Minn. 200, 161 N. W. 524, who applied the rule laid down in the Gray
Case. See infra, pp. 765, 766.
30(1912) 118 Minn. 410, 136 N. W. 1092.40The court again discussed both Bohn Mfg. Co. v. Hollis, (1893) 54
Minn. 223, 55 N. W. 1119, 21 L. R. A. 337, 40 Am. St. Rep. 319, and Ertz
v. Produce Exchange of Minneapolis, (1900) 79 Minn. 140, 81 N. W. 737,
48 L. R. A. 90, 79 Am. St. Rep. 433, and found the facts to require the
application of the Bohn Case.
41(1918) 2 MINNESOTA LAW RE IEW 524.
42Haverhill Strand Theater, Inc. v. Gillen, (1918) 229 Mass. 413, 118
N. E. 671,
43(1917) 136 Minn. 167, 161 N. W. 520, 1055.
44See footnote 37.
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facts most favorable to the defendant since the refusal of the
injunction by the trial court amounted to a finding that the alle-
gations of plaintiff's complaint and affidavits in support thereof
were not true in so far as denied.45 Accordingly the court found
that although defendants had tried by various means 46 to induce
plaintiff contractor to employ only union men, no one act of the
defendant had resulted in substantial damage to plaintiff, there
was no threatened injury to be enjoined, and that the few and
isolated interferences were not "important enough to warrant
injunctive relief." 47 The court held that the desire to strengthen
the union was a justification for the defendant's activities, and
therefore it was lawful for defendant to refuse to work for a sub-
contractor on a building who used only union men if the plaintiff
was working or had worked on the same building with his non-
union men, citing as authority the Gray Case. The court recog-
nized that generally an interference with a third person with whom
defendant has no contract relation would be unlawful but that
"conditions may be such as to furnish justification for such con-
duct." The justification might be found in the pursuit of a
lawful object," even though the necessary result might be an
injury to others.49
In a second opinion,"5 the court passed on two statutes raised
by the plaintiff on appeal, but not mentioned in the first opinion.
The court found that defendant was not guilty of a conspiracy 5'
45The same construction is adopted by the court in later cases, as will
be pointed out.
46The facts showed that the defendants had refused to work on a build.
ing where plaintiffs had worked unless plaintiff be given no more work
(plaintiff had already performed most of the work); that defendant had
placed a lumber company on an unfair list for employing plaintiff company
instead of union labor; that defendants on a few occasions had refused to
work with a steam shovel and scaffold belonging to plaintiff and being
used by another contractor.
.4The court's stress ou the facts as the basis for its decision and its
desire to limit the decision to the facts is found in its statement (at p. 172),
"Ve will do well to confine ourselves to the facts of this case, and determine
only the rights of the parties arising from those facts."48As to what a "lawful object" is, the court is not clear, but it does
indicate that the test is broader than intent.
"9Bohn Mfg. Co. v. Hollis, (1893) 54 Minn. 223, 55 N. W. 1119, 21
L. R. A. 337, 40 Am. St. Rep. 319, and Joyce v. Great Northern Ry. Co.,
(1907) 100 Minn. 225, 110 N. W. 975, were cited by the court.
5OFiled May 4, 1917. The first opinion of the court was filed Feb. 23,
1917.5
'
1 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat. sec. 10055, provides that:
"Whenever two or more persons shall conspire:
(5) to prevent another from exercising any lawful trade or calling
or from doing any other lawful act, by force, threats, intimidation ...
(6) or to commit any act injurious to ... trade or commerce
Every such person shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."
This appears to have been the first time this statute was passed on. See
supra, footnote 35 and text.
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nor was it guilty of a combination in restraint of trade. 52 The
court pointed out that a statute 53 expressly exempts a peaceable
assembling by labor to raise wages from the operation of the
conspiracy statute.
From some of the general language used in the first opinion
it may perhaps be argued that the effect of the Grant Case was to
make boycotts legal.5 4  Yet sufficient indications of a contrary
intent of the court may be found. The court cautioned that it
was confining itself to the facts of the case and was not attempting
to define the limits of activities of labor in general. Furthermore,
in holding the acts of the defendant to be lawful the court pro-
fessed to base its decision squarely on the Gray Case." In the light
of such qualifying words, it is not safe to assume that the Minne-
sota court has legalized boycotts.
The question of the extent to which a union may banner an
employer who refuses to employ union members was raised direct-
ly in Steffes v. Motion Picture Machine Operators Union of
Minneapolis Plaintiff appealed from an order denying his
motion for an injunction pendente lite, and the court, in affirm-
ing the order, stated that it must take a view of the facts most
favorable to the defendant. The plaintiff theater owner employed
a non-union operator and threatened to discharge him if he joined
the union. As a result, defendants employed a picket to banner
plaintiff's place of business with a sign saying "Unfair to Or-
ganized Labor." The court found that it was lawful and justifiable
for the defendant union to attempt to induce plaintiff to hire a
union operator, and that to this end the defendants had the right
to picket and carry the above banner as long as it was done reason-
ably and without malice, regardless of the resulting injury to
plaintiff's business.1
7
As to bannering, the court repeated the rule laid down in the
Gray Case, saying that the words "unfair" when used in a ban-
ner may be lawful or not, depending on the circumstances. The
5
2 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat. sec. 10463, prohibits agreements in restraint
of trade, or which tend to limit the price of any article of trade. This is a
criminal statute.
•
3Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat. sec. 10056.
54(1917) 1 MINNESOTA LAW REvIEW 437; (1920) 4 MINNESOTA LAW
REVIEW 544.
r5The court, after stating the holding in the Gray Case, (1903) 91 Minn.
171, 97 N. W. 663, 1118, said, "We adhere to this decision."
56(1917) 136 Minn. 200, 161 N. W. 524.
lsCf. Grant Construction Co. v. St. Paul Building Trades Council,
(1917) 136 Minn. 167, 161 N. W. 520, 1055.
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court admitted that such a "notification to customers that the
plaintiff is unfair may portend a threat or intimidation, in which
case it will constitute a boycott and is unlawful," but added that a
mere notification without more is not unlawful, since it is not a
threat.5 8 Mr. Justice Hallam, in speaking for the court, also de-
fined "unfair" to connote an unfriendliness on the part of the
person so labeled toward organized labor, and nothing more. So
once again the question of when an "unfair" banner portends a
threat or intimidation was left open.5" Perhaps the court's atti-
tude is manifested in that part of the opinion where it refers to
the right of a picket" to use the streets.6 '
Another case involving a similar question arose in Roraback
v. Motion Picture Machine Operators Union.6 2  The facts were
in dispute, the plaintiff claiming that defendant's sole purpose in
bannering the plaintiff's place of business was to prevent the
plaintiff from running his own machine, while the defendant
claimed that the plaintiff had hired a non-union man to operate
the machine and wanted a union operator to work with him, and
that the right of the plaintiff to work at his own business was only
one of the factors involved. Plaintiff's motion for a temporary
injunction having been denied, the court on appeal said it had to
take the defendant's allegations of fact as true.63  The actual
disposition of the case was to affirm the order of the trial court,
since it was found that on the basis of the facts as presented by
the pleadings and the affidavits pro and con it could not be said
that the trial court had abused its discretion.
In a very vigorous opinion the court recognized that the de-
fendant had relied on the decision in the Steffes Case and had
58But is not such a notification an implied threat to any business man
who "breaks" the picket line? And is not the union policy of blacklisting
such business man a well known fact? Quaere, whether the court would
recognize this as a threat.59(1921) 4 MINNESOTA LAW Rivmw 544, points out the problem.
Cooper, The Fiction of Peaceful Picketing, (1936) 35 Mich. L. Rev. 73,
concludes that practically all bannering is prohibited in most states despite
statutes to the contrary.6OThe court referred to the hired picket as a "pedestrian."
61In Hanson v. Hall, (1938) 202 Nfinn. 381, 279 N. W. 227, defendant
strikers had stopped trucks and cars on a public highway at night, causing
the plaintiff truck driver to collide with one of the trucks so stopped by
defendants. The defendants were held liable for damages 'caused to the
truck. The court stated that while unions have the right to use the highways
equally with others, such a right must he exercised in a legitimate and lawful
manner and could not be used to impede the reasonable use of the highway
by others.
62(1918) 140 Minn. 481, 168 N. W. 766.
6sSee supra, pp. 763 and 765 in same construction on appeal.
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confined its acts to what the court had indicated was permissible
in that decision, but then added that in order for the rule of the
Steffes Case to apply the purpose of the defendant must be law-
ful.0 '4 If the purpose was to prevent the owner from working
at his own machine as plaintiff claimed, then the court announced
that the Steffes Case would not apply, since no such issue was in-
volved in that case. The court declared that,
"However far members of an organization may go in an at-
tempt to force an employer to employ members of the organiza-
tion, an attempt to force him to desist from working himself in
his own business was an invasion of the rights secured to him by
the constitution."''6  [The Bill of Rights and the fourteenth
amendment.]
Mr. Justice Hallam, concurring in the result, redeclared the
rule he had laid down in the Steffes Case, saying that union mem-
bers had a right to refuse" to work with non-union men, and that
they had
"a right in a proper and orderly manner to advise one another
or the public that a certain employer does not employ union
operators or that he insists in operating his own machines. It
seems to me that the main question in the case is whether the con-
duct of defendant has amounted to more than that. If not, their
acts have not been unlawful." 80
Plaintiff's petition for a rehearing on the ground that de-
fendant had violated the state anti-trust statute 7 was denied,68
thus paving the way for the determination of this question in the
Wonderland Theater Case.
In this case, Campbell v. Motion Picture Machine Operators
Union,6 ° the question of a theater owner's right to operate his
1'3 Compare Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, (1937) 301 U. S. 468,
57 Sup. Ct. 857, 81 L. Ed. 1229, where a contrary result was reached on
similar facts.
GThe court also emphasized that to permit such action by the defendant
union would lead to a result where no individual could undertake any enter-
prise which would involve personal work on the part of the owner. In Senn
v. Tile Layers Protective Union, (1937) 301 U. S. 468, 57 Sup. Ct. 857,
81 L. Ed. 1229, the right to picket was said to be based on freedom of
speech and therefore could not be unreasonably abridged. That there is a
conflict between the above two fundamental rights is obvious; whatever
way the balance be decided, its basic importance cannot be overlooked.6GFrom this statement it would seem that a union may always inform the
public of plaintiff's "unfair" attitude or policy, and that if no more than
this be done, it is not unlawful. This would seem to eliminate the qualifica-
tion previously placed on the right to picket that it must not "portend a
threat or intimidation." See footnote 58.
GMason's 1927 Minn. Stat. sec. 10463.68The court said that this question could be better decided in a trial
on the merits in the trial court.69Campbell v. Motion Picture Machine Operators Union, (1922) 151
Minn. 220. 186 N. W. 781.
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own machine was again raised directly. But here the issue was
presented in a different setting. The exact application of the
state anti-trust statute70 prohibiting combinations in restraint of
trade to labor unions had long been in doubt and was expressly
left open in the Roraback Case; consequently the Campbell Case
was chosen to serve as a test case. The facts as found by the
majority ;f the court were that plaintiff owner, who had a con-
tract with the defendant union, decided to operate the machine
himself for purposes of economy, and to that end gave the proper
notice of termination of the contract to the union, telling the
latter that he would be willing to employ a union operator at
union wages for part time relief. The union refused this ar-
rangement and placed the plaintiff on the "We Do Not Patronize
List" of the Trades and Labor Assembly, an association of local
labor and trade unions of which defendant union was a member,
and also published this fact in the official organ of the Assembly,
along with other articles saying that plaintiff was unfair to labor,
etc. The union also employed a picket to carry a banner reading
"This Theater Unfair to Organized Labor" in front of plaintiff's
theater. 7'
The trial court found plaintiff -to be suffering irreparable injury
and enjoined defendant and its members from "interfering with
the patronage of plaintiff's theater by picketing or bannering it
or by publishing statements in the Labor Review72 that plaintiff
is unfair to organized labor, or by publishing in any other man-
ner statements naturally tending to injure or restrain his business."
On appeal the judgment was affirmed, the court saying that the
injunction was justified by the law and facts.
The first question raised under the anti-trust statute pro-
hibiting agreements, trusts, combinations, etc., in restraint of
trade, or agreements, etc., tending to limit, fix, control, etc. the
price of any "article of trade, manufacture, or use," was as to the
right of a private individual to an injunction restraining a violation
of the statute. The majority decided this question in the affirma-
tive, saying that regardless of the anti-trust law, such an injunc-
tion was clearly maintainable under a law enacted in 1917,
7
3 if
70See footnote 67.
7'The duration of the picketing here seems to have reached a new
high. It began shortly after Feb. 24, 1917, and except for a few weeks'
interruption, lasted until the time of the trial of this action on Sept. 23, 1919.72This was the official organ of the Minneapolis Trades & Labor As-
sembly and circulated to all its members.
73Minn. Laws 1917, ch. 493, sec. 2, Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat. sec. 4256,
amended Minn. Laws 1929, ch. 260.
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irreparable injury is found and if there is no adequate remedy at
law. The fact that the act enjoined would also be a crime if
committed is immaterial. The rule for which the case is known is
that a labor union is subject, as is any other combination, to the
anti-trust laws.7 4  The court declared the case to be one of first
impression in the state, saying that the question of the application
of the anti-trust law to trade unions was not decided, even if
mentioned, in two previous Minnesota decisions.75  The court
pointed out the similarity between the state and federal laws,76 and
applied the rule of the United States Supreme Court in the
Danbury Hatters Case77 construing the federal act, as binding
on it. To bring the present case within the prohibitions of the
anti-trust statute, the court defined "trade" to include labor, and
then further defined "trade" to include the theater business,
saying that "trade has been used in its broadest sense and in-
cludes business of any kind in which a person engages for profit." 78
Treating the question of bannering, the court reiterated the
rule of the Gray and Steffes Cases saying that a publication that
plaintiff is "unfair" depends for its lawfulness upon the circum-
stances of each case. Here the majority found that defendant's
purpose was to restrain plaintiff's trade, and that this was unlaw-
ful,7 1' and the publication being in furtherance of the unlawful
combination, were also unlawful. The court did not discuss the
implication of threat or intimidation from such a banner, but
merely stated that since here it was done for the unlawful pur-
pose"0 of restraining plaintiff's business it was properly enjoinable.
74No decision in Minnesota ever has held a trade union as such to be
itself a combination in restraint of trade.
7 State v. Duluth Board of Trade, (1909) 107 Minn. 506, 517, 121
N. W. 395, 23 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1260; Grant Construction Co. v. Building
Trades Council, (1917) 136 Minn. 167, 161 N. W. 520, 1055, see supra, p. 765.
7615 U. S. C. A., secs. 1-7, 2 Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 15, secs. 1-7
(Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890). This similarity was pointed out in
State v. Duluth Board of Trade, (1909) 107 Minn. 506, 517, 121 N. Wl.
395, 23 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1260.
77Loewe v. Lawlor, (1908) 208 U. S. 274, 28 Sup. Ct. 301, 52 L. Ed.
488, 13 Ann. Cas. 815.
7sSee criticism in Warm, The Judicial Attitude Towards Labor Unions,
(1939) 23 'MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 255, 346-7.
79This decision would seem to make any act whereby a union attempts
to exert pressure on plaintiff by causing a loss of business to the plaintiff
by picketing, etc., as in Steffes v. Motion Picture Machine Operators Union
of Minneapolis, (1917) 136 Minn. 200, 161 N. W. 524, and Roraback v.
Motion Picture Machine Operators Union, (1918) 140 Minn. 481, 168
N. W. 766, to be an unlawful purpose under the anti-trust law. If this is so,
this decision is very destrfictive of the interests of organized labor.SOThe court would seem to allow bannering if the only purpose were to
notify the public of the controversy with plaintiff. But obviously there is
always an accompanying purpose to restrain plaintiff's trade; and if this
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This would seem to contradict the Steffes Case, although purport-
ing to recognize it, since the bannering is allowed even under the
Steffes Case only when the purpose is lawful; and by the majority
opinion in the Campbell Case it seems that the purpose is unlaw-
ful when it is intended to restrain plaintiff's business. The atti-
tude8' of the court would seem to support such an implication,
although it may be argued 2 and is to be hoped that the decision
was limited to the situation where the pressure is exerted against
plaintiff because he wishes to engage personally in his business.
Mr. Justice Dibell in a vigorous dissenting opinion, concurred
in by Mr. Justice Hallam, argued that the anti-trust statute did
not apply to labor unions. His conclusion was based on three
grounds: (1) the history of the enactment of the statute, (2) the
plain meaning of the statute itseltf, and (3) that by the terms of
two other statutes,8 3 express exemptions are made for labor
unions. It was also pointed out that the anti-trust statute was
intended to complement art. 4, sec. 3584 of the Minnesota con-
stitution as amended in 1888, making a combination to monopolize
food markets, etc., a conspiracy. Second, it was said that by the
terms of the statute itself labor is, not mentioned, and that labor
clearly is not a commodity or article of trade or commerce.85
Finally, the dissent argued that by express provision" unions are
exempted from operation of the conspiracy statutes and are allowed
to assemble peacefully for the purpose of cooperating to obtain
is true, then the purpose would always be unlawful by the test of the
majority opinion.'
8lThe court said that the injuncticn against bannering the plaintiff as
unfair, and against the publications in the Labor Review, did not deprive
the defendants of freedom of speech, saying that here the words had become
verbal acts and were enjoinable to the same extent as the use of any other
means of force whereby property is wrongfully injured. Cf. Senn v. Tile
Layers Protective Union, (1937) 301 U. S. 468, 57 Sup. Ct. 857, 81 L. Ed.
1229; Schuster v. International Ass'n of Machinists, (1938) 293 Ill. App.
177, 12 N. E. (2d) 50, 53-4. Furthermore the court seemed to lose no time
in applying the 1917 Act so as to allow a private individual an injunction,
despite the fact that no injunction was requested by either counsel in their
briefs.
82Compare the attitude of the court in Roraback v. Motion Picture
Machine Operators Union, (1918) 140 Minn. 481, 168 N. W. 766.
8 3Minn. Laws 1917, ch. 493, sec. 1, Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 4255;
Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 10056.84"Any combination of persons . .. to monopolize the markets for food
products in this state ... is hereby declared to be a criminal conspiracy and
shall be punished in such manner as the legislature may provide."
85The dissent cites State v. Duluth Board of Trade, (1909) 107 Minn.
506, 517, 121 N. W. 395, 23 L. R. A. (N.S) 1260, as holding to the above
effect. On this point it is in express disagreement with the majority opinion.
86Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 10056.
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an increase in wages, and that by a statute87 enacted after the
anti-trust act, labor is declared not to be "an article or commodity
of commerce." The dissent further urged that even under the
common law rules the injunction granted was too broad, and that
the prohibitions against publications in the Labor Review and
peaceful bannering merely setting forth the facts of the dispute
to the public should be omitted.
In Minnesota Stove Co. v. Cavanaugh,"8 certain unlawful
activities of strikers were restrained as exceeding the rights of
labor even in a situation clearly involving a dispute between an
employer and his employees. A motion for an injunction pendente
lite was granted by the court on the basis of the complaint and
answer, affidavits pro and con, and certain records of the munic-
ipal court. It appeared that the defendants had threatened in-
jury to those who continued to work and to their families, and
that three of the defendants had pleaded guilty in municipal court
to charges of abusive language tending to provoke assault.8 9 On
appeal the order was affirmed as modified, the injunction being
sustained except in so far as it restrained defendants from "com-
pelling or inducing or attempting to compel or induce employees
of plaintiff to refuse or fail to perform their duties as such em-
ployees ;" the court held that such peaceful persuasion to induce
others to quit plaintiff's employ was lawful.90
The first comprehensive legislative attempt to define the rights
of organized labor in Minnesota was made in 1917.°1 Although
more specific than the federal law, the Minnesota Act, like other
state laws, was based in part on sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton
Act9 2 passed by Congress in 1914.
By section l," the right of labor to organize is dearly de-
87Minn. Laws 1917, ch. 493, sec. 4, Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 4258.
88(1915) 131 Minn. 458, 155 N. IV. 638.
89As to language permitted by pickets in a strike, see Machinery Co. v.
Toohey, (1921) 114 Misc. Rep. 185, 189, 186 N. Y. S. 95; Warm, Thejudicial Attitude Toward Trade Unions, (1939) 23 MINNESOTA LAW RE-
viW 255, 276.99The court cited no case in any part of its opinion. It seem that the
court could have easily reached the same result on the basis of Mason's 1927
Minn. Stat., sec. 10431 (1), defining a threat to a person or family of such
persons to the end of getting him to do an act which he is not lawfully
obligated to do, to be a misdemeanor. However, it seems that where actual
violence is found, the court need not rely on the statute but has sufficient
authority on the basis of common law rules as to the conduct permitted for
strikers. See also Note, (1928) 12 MINNESOTA LAw REvIEw 162.
"'Minn. Laws 1917, ch. 493, secs. 1-6, Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., secs.
4255-4260.922 Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 29, sec. 52, 29 U. S. C. A. sec. 52.
93Minn. Laws 1917, ch. 493, sec. 1, Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 4255.
Compare a similar policy set forth in Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 8596.
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clared, and it is stated that it shall not be unlawful for working
men and women to organize into unions for purposes of raising
wages or shortening hours or bettering conditions of the members
of such unions, or for carrying out their legitimate purposes as
freely as they could do if acting singly.
By section 2,1- the jurisdiction of the court to issue an injunc-
tion in cases concerning disputes over terms or conditions of
employment is limited to cases where it is necessary to prevent
irreparable injury to property or to a property right of the per-
son making the application, regardless of whether the dispute is
between an employer and employee or employees, or between
employees, or between employees and persons seeking employment.
As amended in 1929,9 5 section 2 now specifies that the showing of
irreparable injury must be made in court after a notice and
hearing. Section 2 was further amended by adding to the last
sentence a proviso allowing a temporary restraining order to
issue without such notice and hearing "upon a proper showing that
violence is actually being caused or is imminently probable on the
part of the person or persons sought to be restrained," and pro-
vided that all persons be equally restrained.
By section 3,96 the court is prohibited from enjoining certain
enumerated acts which are declared not to be unlawful whether
done "singly or in concert," including the following acts: ending
any employment relationship and ceasing to work, and persuading
others to do so by peaceful means; going .to any place where
persons are at work to so persuade them to cease work; ceasing
to patronize any party to such dispute; peacefully assembling in
a lawful manner for a lawful purpose.
By section 4,97 it is declared that the "labor of a human being
is not a commodity or article of commerce" and that the right
9
'Minn. Laws 1917, ch. 493, sec. 2, Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 4256.
Compare 2 Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 29, sec. 52.
95Minn. Laws 1929, ch. 260. Cf. Mason's Minn. Stat., 1940 Supp., secs.
4260-7-8 (Minnesota Labor Disputes Injunction Act 1933), and also Minn.
Laws 1939, ch. 440, sec. 14, Mason's Minn. Stat., 1940 Supp., secs. 4254-34(Minnesota Labor Relations Act). See supra, footnotes 29 and 30.
DGMinn. Laws 1917, ch. 493, sec. 3, Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 4257.
97Minn. Laws 1917, ch. 493, sec. 4, Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 4258.
In section 6 of the Sherman Act, 2 Mascn's U. S. Code, tit. 15, 2 U. S. C. A.
tit. 15, it is likewise declared that "labor of a human being is not a commodity
or article of commerce," and that nothing in the anti-trust laws shall be
construed to forbid labor organizations instituted for purposes of self help,
nor any such organization from lawfully carrying out its obiects if legiti-
mate; and that such organizations and members thereof shall not be con-
" strued to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade under
the anti-trust laws.
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of the laborer to enter into any employment relationship or with-
draw therefrom "shall be held and construed to be a personal, and
not a property right ;" that in all cases involving-a violation of an
employment contract by either the employer or employee the parties
shall be left to their remedy at law; and that no injunction shall
issue unless necessary to prevent irreparable damage to property
or a property right of either.
By section 5, 98 it is declared that no person is to be indicted
for entering into any agreement, combination, etc., for the pur-
pose of increasing wages or bettering conditions, etc., "unless such
act is in itself forbidden by law if done by a single individual."
By section 6,9' the power of the courts to issue injunctions in
cases of violence, threats, or unlawful acts to prevent irreparable
injury to business or property is said not to be limited.
The passage of the various state acts modeled after the Clay-
ton Act was an attempt to get around the decisions of the courts
declaring unions to be subject to the anti-trust laws."" But even
this was to no avail once the destructive forces of judicial inter-
pretation seized hold of the "Magna Charta" of labor. In Minne-
sota, the 1917 act has been considered only in the Campbell Case,
where the court refused to apply the law except in so far as sec-
tion 21"1 allowed an injunction when necessary to prevent irre-
parable injury. By the majority opinion section 3102 was said to
be declaratory of the principles previously announced by the
court, while section 4103 was not even mentioned. Since no further
cases have treated this law, its exact application is uncertain, al-
though it would seem that at least in so far as its provisions differ
from the provisions in the Clayton Act, and that in so far as no
federal decision0 4 has construed identical provisions in the Clay-
08Minn. Laws 1917, ch. 493, sec. 5, Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec 4259.VoMinn. Laws 1917, ch. 493, sec. 6, Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 4260.
100(1922) 6 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEw 532; (1935) Note, 84 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 771.]lOSee footnote 94.
lO2See footnote 96.
lOlSee footnote 97.
1n4Three decisions bv the United States Supreme Court soon eliminated
the supposed gains provided for labor by the Clayton Act, 2 Mason's U. S.
Code, tit. 29, 29 U. S. C. A. sec. 52. In Duplex Printing Press Co. v.
Deering, (1921) 254 U. S. 443, 41 Sup. Ct. 172, 65 L. Ed. 349, the court held
that the Act applied only to direct disputes between an employer and an
employee. In American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council,(1921) 257 U. S. 184, 42 Sup. Ct. 72, 66 L. Ed. 189, the right to picket was
limited to the posting of one picket at each place of ingress and egress.
In Truax v. Corrigan, (1921) 257 U. S. 312, 42 Sup. Ct. 124, 66 L. Ed.
254, 27 A. L. R. 375 and note, 411, discussed in (1922) 31 Yale L. J. 408,
the court held that an Arizona statute similar to the 1917 Minnesota Act,
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ton Act, the 1917 law is still capable of application in Minne-
sota.105 It is clear that some"0 6 state courts have given such effect
to similar state laws.
III. THE LABOR DISPUTES INJUNCTION ACT OF 1933
A second effort to limit the application of the injunction to
legitimate labor activities was given impetus in 1932 with the
passage by Congress of the Norris-La Guardia Act. 07 The state
legislatures soon adopted similar laws, Minnesota being one of the
first to do so with its passage in 1933 of the Labor Disputes In-
junction Act.' 8 The Minnesota statute, based on the federal law
rather than the model state act, 0 9 may be divided into three parts,
(1) the provision making yellow dog contracts unenforceable,
(2) the provisions prohibiting injunctions in certain enumerated
cases and limiting the jurisdiction of the courts to grant injunc-
tions in other cases unless certain procedural requirements be
met, and (3) the provision for jury trials in cases of contempt
for the violation of an injunction.
Section 1 places a general limit on the jurisdiction of the courts
if construed to deny employers of labor the right to an injunction, was void
under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment as unreason-
able, and if construed to make non-violent acts of strikers lawful was void
under the due process clause.
1050p. Att'y Gen. May 31, 1933: Laws 1933, ch. 416, Mason's Minn.
Stat., 1940 Supp., secs. 4260-1-15 (Minnesota Labor Disputes Injunction
Act) should be construed as supplemental to Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., secs.
4255-60. But by Minn. Laws 1939, ch. 440, sec. 14, Mason's Minn. Stat.,
1940 Supp., secs. 4254-34, 4256-60 as well as sees. 4260-1-15 are made
inapplicable in certain cases.
loSimilar state laws were held to be valid exercises of the police power
in Fenske Bros., Inc. v. Upholsterers' International Union of North
America, (1934) 358 Ill. 239, 193 N. E. 112; Schuster v. International
Ass'n of Machinists, (.1938) 293 Ill. App. 177, 12 N. E. (2d) 50. Accord;
Leitzman v. Radio Broadcasting Station WCFL, (1935) 282 Ill. App. 203,
220 (held that it was not an unlawful act to broadcast over the radio that the
plaintiff is "unfair" and that friends of labor should not patronize him);
Scofes v. Helmar, (1933) 205 Ind. 596, 187 N. E. 662; Bayonne Textile
Corp. v. American Federation of Silk Workers, (1934) 116 N. J. Eq. 146,
164, 172 Atl. 551, 92 A. L. R. 1450; Thomas v. International Seamen's
Union of North America, (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) 101 S. W. (2d) 328.
Contra, Bull v. International Alliance, (1925) 119 Kan. 713, 241 Pac. 459.
107Act of March 23, 1932, ch. 90, 47 Stat. at L. 70, 29 U. S. C. A.
101-115, 2 Mason's U. S. Code. tit. 29, secs. 101-115.
1oSMinn. Laws 1933, ch. 416, p. 777, Mason's Minn. Stat., 1940 Supp.,
secs. 4260-1-4260-15. Similar laws have been adopted in Colorado, Idaho,
Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New
York, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsyvania, Rhode Island, Utah, Washing-
ton, Wisconsin, Wyoming.
l091MfcClintock, The Minnesota Labor Disputes Injunction Act, (1937)
21 MINNESOTA LAW REVEmW 619; Monkmeyer, Five Years of the Norris-
La Guardia Act, (1937) 2 Mo. L. Rev. 1; Riddlesbarger, State Anti-Injunc-
tion Legislation, (1935) 14 Or. L. Rev. 501, 506.
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to issue any temporary or permanent injunction or any temporary
restraining order in cases arising out of labor disputes, except
by a strict conformity with the provisions of the Act.
In section 2 the policy of the law is declared to be that the
individual worker shall be free to associate with a labor organiza-
tion or not as he sees fit and that he shall be free from any
interference from employers.
In section 3 the Act provides that any agreement or promise
in conflict with the policy set forth in section 2 and any agreement
not to join a labor organization or to withdraw from employ-
ment if the' employee joins such an organization shall not be
enforceable in any court of the state and shall not be the basis for
legal or equitable relief. In other words, yellow-dog contracts are
declared invalid.
By section 4, in cases involving or growing out of labor dis-
putes as defined in the Act, the court is deprived of jurisdiction to
issue an injunction or temporary restraining order against any
person participating in or interested in such dispute to prevent
the doing of certain specified acts,11-0 whether singly or in concert.
In section 5 it is provided that no court shall have jurisdiction
to issue an injunction or restraining order on the ground that a
person is engaged in an unlawful combination or conspiracy be-
cause of the doing of the acts set out in section 4.
110(a) "Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any
relation of employment;(b) Becoming or remaining a member of any labor organization or of
any employer organization regardless of any such undertaking or promise
as is described in section 3 of this Act;(c) Paying or giving to, or withholding from any person participating
or interested in such labof dispute, any strike or unemployment benefits or
insurance, or other moneys or things of value;
(d) By all lawful means aiding any person participating or interested
in any labor dispute who is being proceeded against in, or is prosecuting,
any action or suit in any court of this state;(e) Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved in, any
labor dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling, or by any other
method not involving fraud or violence;
(f) Assembling peaceably to act or to organize to act in promotion
of their interests in a labor dispute;(g) Advising or notifying any person of an intention to do any of the
acts heretofore specified;(h) Agreeing with other persons to do or not to do any of the acts
heretofore specified; and(i) Advising, urging, or otherwise causing or inducing without fraud
or violence the acts heretofore specified, regardless of any such undertaking
or promise as is described in section 3 of this Act."
It will be noted that section 4 is very similar to Mason's 1927 Minn.
Stat. sec. 4257, and sec. 20 of the Clayton Act, 2 Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 29,
sec. 52, 29 U. S. C. A. sec. 52, except that the words "lawful" and "lawfully"
are omitted.
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In section 6 the liability of labor organizations, officers, and
members for unlawful acts committed during a labor dispute is
limited to those cases where clear proof of participation in, authori-
zation of, or ratification of such acts is shown.
In section 7, the procedural limit on the granting of injunc-
tions is set out. The court's jurisdiction to grant temporary
restraining orders or injunctions is conditioned upon several
things: (1) there must be a hearing in open court with witnesses
and a chance to cross-examine, (2) there must be findings of fact
to the effect that,"
(a) unlawful acts have been done or are threatened,
(b) substantial and irreparable injury will be caused com-
plainant's property,
(c) greater injury will be caused complainant if relief is de-
nied than will be caused the defendant by the granting of such
relief,
(d) no adequate remedy at law exists,
(e) the public officers charged with the duty to protect plain-
tiff's property have failed to do so.
This provision further requires that certain persons be given notice
of the above hearing. A proviso is added that a temporary re-
straining order may be issued without notice of such hearing if it
is alleged that irreparable injury is unavoidable, and if the testi-
mony given under oath would be sufficient to support an injunc-
tion upon hearing after notice. The temporary restraining order
expires with the hearing of the motion for temporary injunction,
but in no case can it last for more than ten days unless renewed
by the court. The complainant must further file a bond to secure
any damages to the defendant and any expenses incurred because
of the "improvident or erroneous issuance of such order or injunc-
tion."
Section 8 limits the scope of the injunction to the findings of
fact as based on the acts expressly complained of in the com-
plaint.
Section 9 provides for a speedy :-eview in the Supreme Court
by appeal from cases involving labor disputes.
Section 10 provides that in all cases of contempt of court the
accused shall have the right to a speedy trial, and also the right
to a jury trial, except where the contempt is committed in the
presence of the court or in some other manner directly interferes
with the administration of justice.
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Section 11 allows the removal of the judge in certain con-
tempt proceedings for certain designated reasons.
In section 12 the terms used in the Act are defined. Under sub-
section (a), a case involves or grows out of a labor dispute when
it involves persons engaged in the same industry, trade, craft or
occupation, or if not so engaged, if it involves persons who have
direct or indirect interests therein; or where the dispute involves
employees of the same employer; or persons who are members
of the same organization of employers or employees. A labor
dispute is further said to exist where such dispute is (1) be-
tween one or more employers or associations of employers and
one or more employees or associations of employees, (2) between
different employers or associations of employers, (3) between dif-
ferent employees or associations of employees, or when the case
involves any conflicting interest in a "labor dispute" as hereinafter
defined of "persons participating or interested" therein (as herein-
after defined). By subsection (b) a person or association is said
to be interested or participating in a labor dispute if relief is
sought against him or it, or if he is engaged in the same industry,
etc., or if he has a direct or indirect interest therein, or if he is a
member of any association, etc., engaged in such industry, etc.
Under subsection (c) a "labor dispute" exists where there is a
controversy over terms or conditions of employment or over
representation to fix terms or conditions of employment "regard-
less of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate
relation of employer and employee." Subsection (d) defines a
"court of the state of Minnesota" to mean a legislative court.
This Act was not intended to repeal previous legislation."-
Although this statute has been before the supreme court several
times since its passage, the issue of constitutionality never has
been raised directly. This fact may perhaps be taken as indica-
tive of its validity.
IV. VALIDITY OF THE ANTI-INJUNCTION AcTs IN GENERAL
The exact status of the Norris-La Guardia Act remained
uncertain until the decision of the United States Supreme Court
in Lauf v. Shinner."12 In that case, although the constitutionality
of the Act was not directly in issue, the granting of the injunction
by the federal district court was set aside on the ground that the
district court had exceeded its jurisdiction in granting the injunc-
"'See footnote 105.1'(1938) 303 U. S. 323, 58 Sup. Ct. 578, 82 L. Ed. 872.
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tion without having made the necessary findings of fact as re-
quired in section 7.11 The court further held that Congress
had the power to limit the jurisdiction of the inferior courts of
the United States.114
A similar position had already been taken as to the Wisconsin
anti-injunction law"'1 by both the Wisconsin court 16 and the
United States Supreme Court.1 1  The Wisconsin court sustained
the statute, saying that it did nor violate the fourteenth amend-
ment of the federal constitution, either as to the due process or the
equal protection clause, and also that it did not violate any of
the provisions in the state constitution granting equity jurisdiction
to the courts or guaranteeing an injured party a certainty of remedy
under the law. The provision of the Wisconsin act expressly
declaring certain acts to be lawful was also sustained on the
ground that it was a proper exercise of a legislative function
since it tends to offset the advantages inherent in the employer in
cases involving labor controversies.""
In the Semn Case, the United States Supreme Court sustained
the Wisconsin Act finding a labor dispute to exist where the
defendant union sought by picketing to induce the plaintiff con-
tractor to cease working personally on jobs, and saying that such
a purpose was lawful," g9 since it was for the general welfare of
union members. The court allowed the picketing, stating that a
state law could make lawful peaceful picketing"20 in pursuit of a
lawful purpose without violating the due process clause of the
:"3This provision is identical with sec. 7 of the Minnesota Act, supra,
p. 776.
114(1938) New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., (1938) 303
U. S. 552, 58 Sup. Ct. 703, 82 L. Ed. 1012 accord.
"15Wis. Laws 1931, ch. 376, Wis. Stats., sec. 103: 51-103: 63.
l16American Furniture Co. v. I. B. "of T. C. & H. of A., (1936) 222
Wis. 338, 268 N. W. 250, discussed in (1937) 21 MIxNEsoTA LAW REVIEW
467.
"'7Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, (1937) 301 U. S. 468, 57 Sup.
Ct. 857, 81 L. Ed. 1229, discussed in (1938) 22 MImEsoTA LAW REVIEW
271.
218 Such a frank recognition of the inequality of labor and capital in
bargaining ability is commended by various comments, (1937) 35 Mich. L.
Rev. 340; (1935) 33 Mich. L. Rev. 777; (1939) 23 MINNESOTA LAW
REvraw 853.
"19Compare the attitude of the Minnesota court in Roraback v. Motion
Picture Machine Operators Union, (1918) 140 Minn. 481, 168 N. W. 766,
and Campbell v. Motion Picture MacHne Operators Union, (1922) 151
Minn. 220, 186 N. W. 781. Cf. Thompson v. Boekeout, (1937) 273 N. Y.
390, 7 N. E. (2d) 674.
"2'The court distinguished Truax v. Corrigan, (1921) 257 U. S. 312,
42 Sup. Ct. 124, 66 L. Ed. 254, 27 A. L. R. 375, on its facts saying that
there the decision was based on the abusive and libellous language used
against the plaintiff.
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fourteenth amendment. The court did not pass on the question
of the equal protection clause, but merely commented that the
conduct authorized by the statute was lawful, and therefore the
plaintiff could have no right to a "remedy" against the lawful
conduct of another.
The state anti-injunction acts may be divided into two classes
in so far as they affect the rights of the employer to maintain
a suit for injunction against alleged unlawful acts of a labor
union.1 1 By far the most common type is that similar to the
Minnesota Act. This type of act operates negatively, in that
it eliminates the jurisdiction of the court in certain specific in-
stances,'22 while in all other situations certain procedural require-
ments123 are imposed upon its jurisdiction. The second type of
law is that adopted by Wisconsin in 1931. By that law, 24 the acts
enumerated in the counterpart of section 4 of the Minnesota Act
are not only declared immune from injunctive relief but are also
declared to be legal. That there is a vast difference between
these two types of laws is obvious, since the prohibition of the
injunction merely abrogates or limits, as the case may be, the
right of the employer to equitable relief, but still leaves him an
action for damages-which, in one case' 25 at least, has been
allowed in the same proceeding after the injunction had been
denied, 20 notwithstanding no allegation of damages had been
made in the complaint. If such relief remains for the employer,
it seems that the rights and remedies of the employer in labor
disputes are not so drastically curtailed as might appear upon
first glance.
Some of the peculiar -obstacles facing the state acts in their
construction by the court are found in the provisions of the
various state constitutions granting jurisdiction to the courts in
equity matters'27 and guaranteeing an injured party a certain
remedy in the laws. 23  Also the provisions in the various state
laws of the first type defining the "courts" referred to through-
-12Riddlesbarger, State Anti-Injunction Legislation, (1935) 14 Or. L.
Rev. 501.2 2See footnote 110.2 3See supra, p. 776.
12 4See footnote 115.
'
25Hubrite Informal Frocks v. Kramer, (Mass. 1937) 9 N. E. (2d) 570.
12 The court found the issue of the right to an injunction had become
moot, since the activities complained of had ceased.
127Minnesota constitution, art. 6, see. 5: "District court has original
jurisdiction in all civil cases of law and equity over one-hundred dollars."
'12Minn. constitution, art. 1, sec. 8.
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out the acts to be legislative courts'2 9 present difficult problems
under the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. An-
other basis for constitutional difficulties is found in the provi-
sions in the statutes granting jury trial' 30 to the accused in con-
tempt proceedings arising from a violation of the injunction or
other indirect contempts. All this is in addition to the con-
stitutional objections suggested before the passage of some state
acts, 131 and to the decision of the United States Supreme Court
in Truat v. Corrigan.3 2  In spite of all this the constitutionality
of the state acts has been upheld, with one exception,"33 in every
state court where the issue has been raised.
Except where the statute expressly has so declared,'3 4 no
court passing on the question has held the effect of the first type
of law to be to make lawful any of the enumerated activities de-
clared to be exempt from injunction, although a different con-
struction seems to have been given by some courts 35 to the earlier
statutes modeled after the Clayton Act. The construction which
the Minnesota court would give to the 1933 Act has perhaps been
indicated in a recent decision."'
In the only case dealing with the matter, the Washington court
in the Blanchard Case held that a statute identical with that in
Minnesota was void as a violation of the state constitutional pro-
vision' 37 granting judicial power to the court in equity cases.
Although no similar provision exists in the Oregon constitution,
the Oregon cour' 38 in upholding its act 9 expressed disagree-
129Thus Mason's Minn. Stat., 1940 Supp., sec. 4260-12-(d).
"30 Mason's Minn. Stat., 1940 Supp., sec. 4260-10.
"'In re opinion of Justices, (1931) 275 Mass. 580, 176 N. E. 649;
In re opinion of Justices, (1933) 86 N. H. 597, 166 Atl. 640.
132(1921) 257 U. S. 312, 42 Sup. Ct. 124, 66 L. Ed. 254, 27 A. L. R.
375, and note, 411.
"33Blanchard v. Golden Age Brewing Co. (1936) 188 Wash. 396, 63
P. (2d) 397.
"a4See footnotes 115 and 124.
135 See footnote 105. Cf. Culinary Workers Union v. Fuller, (Tex. Civ.
App. 1937) 105 S. W. (2d) 295.
'
36State v. Cooper, (Minn. 1939) 285 N. W. 903. Three of the sixjustices sitting seemed to assume that the 1933 Act made lawful the acts
which were not to be enjoined in section 4. Of course such a conclusion
would not necessarily be binding in z. future case, since the above threejustices did not constitute a majority; furthermore, the assumption was
not necessary to reach the decision. See discussion in Fraenkel, One Hun-
dred and Fifty Years of the Bill of Rights, (1939) 23 MINNESOTA LAW
REvIEw 719, 769.
137Washington, constitution, art. 4, sec. 6.
1"8Starr v. Laundry and Dry Cleaning Workers Local Union, (1936)
155 Or. 634, 63 P. (2d) 1104.
"
90The statutes in all three states are identical, except that the Min-
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ment with the majority opinion in the Washington case, and
agreed with the dissenting opinion in that case which argued that
the legislature could limit the remedy of injunction.'"' The
Oregon court further pointed out that by a provision in the
Washington constitution (art. 4, sec. 6) the court is given express
power to issue injunctions. As to this point, the Minnesota con-
stitution would seem to be half-way between the Washington
and Oregon constitutions since the Minnesota constitution414
does provide that the district court shall have equity jurisdiction,
but does not expressly provide that the court shall have power to
issue injunctions. It has been pointed out by one writer' 42 that the
extent to which the Minnesota court will find the Washington de-
cision to be persuasive authority may depend upon the previous
attitudes of the two courts in construing their respective con-
stitutional provisions.
Provisions similar to that in the Minnesota constitution guar-
anteeing a certain remedy in law for injuries sustained to property,
person, or character have been passed on in a few states. In a
Wisconsin case,' 43 the court held that the Wisconsin law did not
violate the constitutional guarantee of a certain remedy in the
law. Likewise in Indiana, the court, in sustaining 4 4 its anti-
injunction law, 4 5 applied the rule announced in a previous In-
diana decision,148 that a prohibition against injunctions in certain
cases did not abridge the constitutional guarantee 4 of a certain
remedy in the laws. 48  The Minnesota court has not expressed
any opinion on this point since the passage of the Labor Disputes
nesota Act does not contain a provision requiring resort to arbitration be-
fore an injunction may be sought.
"4OThe dissent in the Washington case based its argument upon an
analogy to a statute which limited the right to obtain an injunction to
restrain the collection of taxes where a tax dispute existed, except under
certain circumstances, which law was held valid in Casco v. Thurston
County, (1931) 163 Wash. 666, 2 P. (2d) 677, 77 A. L. R. 622.
"4Minn. constitution, art. 6, sec. 5.
142McClintock, The Minnesota Labor Disputes Injunction Act, (1937)
21 MINNESOTA LAw REvIEw 619, 629-31, in which it is suggested that the
two courts have not reasoned the same in analogous cases, and that even in
the Washington case itself, three of the eight justices dissented.
"43American Furniture Co. v. I. B. of T. C. & H. of A., (1936) 222
Wis. 338, 268 N. W. 250.
144Local Union, etc. v. City of Kokomo, (1937) 211 Ind. 72, 5 N. E.(2d) 624.
145The Indiana Act is identical with the Minnesota Act of 1933, except
that the Minnesota Act does not require the plaintiff to resort to arbitration.
146Scofes v. Helmar, (1933) 205 Ind. 596, 187 N. E. 662.
247Indiana, constitution, art. 1, sec. 12.
148The court relied on Fenske Bros. v. Upholsterers International Union
of North America, (1934) 358 Ill. 239, 193 N. E. 112.
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Injunction Act, but in dictum in the Gray Case' ' the court recog-
nized the importance of the above constitutional provision, saying
the "rights so guaranteed are fundamental" and that they could.
be "taken away only by... lawful regulation adopted as necessary
for the general public welfare." It may well be urged that the
policy set forth in section 2 of the 1933 act would be such as to
meet the requirement of "being necessary for the general public
welfare," and in view of the broad construction given to the
words "labor dispute" in a recent Minnesota case, 5 ' such an
approach by the court may be plausible, and certainly would be
desirable.
In a case involving contempt proceedings for the violation of
an injunction, a person not a party to the original action has
been held guilty of contempt on the basis that he knew of the
injunction. 15' The court held that a provision in the state anti-
injunction law granting such person a right to a jury trial was
an unconstitutional encroachment by the legislature on the in-
herent power of the courts to punish violators of its orders in con-
tempt.proceedings. Such a result was predicted in a Massachusetts
advisory opinion. 5 2  A decision to the contrary by the United
States Supreme Court5 3 was distinguished in the Blanchard Case,
the court stating that no analogy could be based on a similar pro-
vision in a federal law as applied to federal district courts, since
the latter were legislative courts whereas the Washington courts
were constitutional courts. Such treatment of the Michaelson
Case seems to be common in the state courts.154  No other cases
having passed on this point since the Washington decision, it
would seem that on the basis of present authority the provision
as to jury trial in contempt proceedings is unconstitutional unless
a court presented with the problem would feel free to hold such
a provision valid on the basis of changing social and economic
conditions. Of course if the other sections of the laws should
be found valid, then on the basis of the separability clause,'1 s and
149Gray v. Building Trades Council, (1903) 91 Minn. 171, 97 N. W.
663, 1118.
35 Lichterman v. Laundry and Dry Cleaning Drivers Union, (1938)
204 Minn. 75, 282 N. W. 689, 283 N. W. 752.
15'Blanchard v. Golden Age Brewing Co., (1936) 188 Wash. 396, 63
P. (2d) 397.
1521n re Opinion of Justices, (1931) 275 Mass. 580, 176 N. E. 649.
'
53Michaelson v. United States, (1924) 266 U. S. 42, 45 Sup. Ct. 18,
69 L. Ed. 162. Note (1925) 9 MINNESOTA LAw REvImw 368.
'
54McClintock, The Minnesota Labor Disputes Injunction Act, (1937)
21 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 619, 631.
155Mason's Minn. Stat., 1940 Supp., sec. 4260-13.
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on the basis of the general independence of this section from the
other provisions in the law, the invalidity of the above provision
would not be fatal.
The procedural limits placed on the court's jurisdiction to
grant injunctions, assuming an injunction suit is otherwise main-
tainable, present a difficult constitutional question and one on
which the courts are not in accord. As to the federal act the
fourteenth amendment is of course no obstacle, and it does not
appear that the question of the violation of the fifth amendment
ever has been raised before the United States Supreme Court.15 6
Although any argument to the Minnesota court based on an
analogy of the interpretation of the Wisconsin law is weakened
because of the express provision in the Wisconsin act making
lawful the acts declared non-enjoinable, still it is to be noted
that no violation of either the due process or the equal protection
clause was found by the Wisconsin court, 15 7 while the United
States Supreme Court' 18 found that it did not have to pass on the
question, since it was not raised on appeal.
In the Washington opinion"59 the court did not discuss the
question of the fourteenth amendment, but held the statute in-
valid on the basis of the state constitution. In two companion
cases, 1 0 the Oregon court held that their statute was not in con-
flict with state or federal constitutional provisions. The granting
of an injunction by the trial court was set aside on appeal for the
reason that the court had no jurisdiction, since the statutory re-
quirement that notice of the hearing for the temporary injunction
be given to certain public officers had not been complied with. As
to the argument raised on appeal that the anti-injunction act
violated the equal protection clause, the court replied that it
found "nothing objectionable in a statute prescribing a special
procedure having for its object the prevention of unjustly pre-
15OSee Lauf v. Shinner, (1938) 303 U. S. 323, 58 Sup. Ct. 578, 82 L. Ed.
872; Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, (1937) 301 U. S. 468, 57 Sup.
Ct. 857, 81 L. Ed. 1229 (dealing with the Wisconsin law); New Negro
Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., (1938) 303 U. S. 552, 58 Sup. Ct. 703,
82 L. Ed. 1012.
" American Furniture Co. v. I. B. of T. C. & H. of A., (1936) 222
Wis. 338, 386 N. W. 250.
l5sSenn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, (1937) 301 U. S. 468, 57 Sup.
Ct. 857, 81 L. Ed. 1229.
'Blanchard v. Golden Age Brewing Co., (1936) 188 Wash. 396, 63
P. (2d) 397.
10OStarr v. Laundry and Dry Cleaning Workers Local Union, (1936) 155
Or. 634, 63 P. (2d) 1104; Geo. B. Wallace Co. v. International Ass'n of
Mechanics, (1936) 155 Or. 652, 63 P. (2d) 1090.
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cipitated permanent injunctive restraint upon the exercise of this
judicially approved lawful right [peaceful picketing]."
In Goldfinger v. Feintuchl'8 the New York court found that
its anti-injunction law' 62 did not violate the fourteenth amendment,
relying on the reasoning of the Senn Case. In Indiana'0 ' the
court found that since the statute merely limited the remedy'
of the employer no question of due process existed, and did not
find the question of the equal protection clause to be in issue.
No federal constitutional question was raised in a Louisiana
opinion,16' and the court sustained the state act against objections
on state constitutional grounds. Although the Massachusetts
court in an advisory opinion 160 had indicated that a law providing a
special procedure as to the granting of injunctions in situations
involving labor disputes would violate the equal protection
clause, the court in a case before it67 subsequent to the enactment
of a modified'6" anti-injunction law refused to pass on the validity
of the statute, saying that since the activities sought to be enjoined
had ceased, the question of the right to an injunction was moot.
In an unsatisfactory opinion the Pennsylvania court' 6 9 seemed
to refuse to recognize that the state anti-injunction act deprived
the court of jurisdiction in cases arising out of labor disputes,
although it seemed-willing to concede that in so far as a labor
dispute was within the situations said to be non-enjoinable in the
act,'70 the court had no power to issue injunctions.
The Minnesota law, in section 12 (d) defines "courts" as
used in the statute to mean legislative ourts .17 Such a definition,
if taken literally, renders the Act an absurdity, since the state
district courts are clearly constitutional courts. 7 2  A similar pro-
261(1937) 276 N. Y. 281, 11 N. E. (2d) 910, 116 A. L. R. 477.
762New York Laws 1935, ch. 477, Giv. Prac. Act sec. 876 (a).
18BLocal Union, etc. v. City of Kokomo, (1937) 211 Ind. 72, 5 N. E.
(2d) 624.
184See discussion, (1937) 46 Yale L. J. 1064.
165Dehan v. Hotel & Restaurant :Employees, etc. Union, (La. App.
1935) 159 So. 637.
2661n re Opinion of Justices, (1931) 275 Mass. 580, 176 N. E. 649.
'
67Hubrite Informal Frocks v. Kramer, (Mass. 1937) 9 N. E. (2d) 570.
1 88Massachusetts Stat. 1935, ch. 407. This statute omitted the provision
making yellow dog contracts unenforceable, and also omitted the enumeration
of specific situations in which an injunction could not issue-for example,
as in Mason's Minn. Stat., 1940 Supp., sec. 4260-4.
169Main Cleaners and Dyers v. Columbia Super Cleaners, (1938) 332
Pa. St. 71, 2 A. (2d) 750. Cf. Bulkin v. Sacks, 41937) 31 Pa. D. & C. 501.lTOPennsylvania, P. L. 1937, 1198, secs. 6 and 7.
17'This is due to a verbatim copying of the Norris-La Guardia Act,
2 Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 29, sec. 113 (d), 29 U. S. C. A. sec. 113 (d).
-72Minnesota, constitution, art. 6, sec. 5.
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vision has existed in the other state acts already discussed, except
Wisconsin, and seems never to have been accepted by the courts 73
as an argument that the statute did not apply to constitutional
courts. As one writer' 74 has pointed out, the court in construing
this provision of the statute would probably recognize the ap-
parent oversight, and in the light of the legislative history, would
disregard the express language rather than hold the Act to be of
no effect on that ground.
Provisions in the federal act and in most state acts' 75 declare
that yellow dog contracts "shall not be enforceable" and shall
not be the basis of "legal or equitable relief by any court.' 76  It
probably is not necessary to distinguish the earlier statutes,' 77
which unsuccessfully 78 tried to outlaw such contracts, as being
criminal statutes while the present anti-injunction acts merely
deny enforcement of such contracts, 79 since the persistently de-
dared legislative policy'80 and public hostility' 8 ' against yellow dog
contracts would probably be given effect.
8 2
Assuming the constitutional validity of a law, its effective-
ness in fulfilling its purpose depends largely upon the interpreta-
tion placed upon it by the courts. Since its passage the Minne-
1
7 3 In Blanchard v. Golden Age Brewing Co., (1936) 188 Wash. 396, 63
P. (2d) 397, the court recognized that the statute was intended to limit thejurisdiction of constitutional courts, and on that basis, held it unconstitu-
tional.
17fMcClintock, The Minnesota Labor Disputes Injunction Act, (1937)
21 MINNESOTA LAW REviEW 619, 622-3.
27-But see footnote 168. For general discussion, see Riddlesbarger, State
Anti-Injunction Legislation, (1935) 14 Or. L. Rev. 501.
761Mason's Minn. Stat., 1940 Supp., see. 4260-2.
17TSee supra, p. 760.
U .78State v. Daniels, (1912) 118 Minn. 155, 136 N. W. 584; Adair v.
United States, (1908) 208 U. S. 161, 28 Sup. Ct. 277, 52 L. Ed. 436; Cop-
page v. Kansas, (1915) 236 U. S. 1, 35 Sup. Ct. 240, 59 L. Ed. 441, L. R. A.
1915C 960.
170Note, (1934) 18 MINN ToA LAw REvIEw 184; (1935) 13 N. Y. U.
L. Quart. 92, criticized in McClintock, Minnesota Labor Disputes Injunction
Act, (1937) 21 MINNESOTA LAW REviEW 619, 625.
180olfinnesota Laws 1939, ch. 440, p. 777, secs. 10 (a), 12 (c), and 12 (f),
Mason's Minn. Stat., 1940 Supp., secs. 4254-30 (a), 4254-32 (c), 4254-32 (f).
Cf. 48 U. S. Stat. at L. 195, 15 U.S.C.A., sec. 7 (a), (N.I.R.A. Act);
49 U. S. Stat at L. 457, 29 U.S.C.A., sec. 151-166, (National Labor Rela-
tions Act).
I8sDoskow, Statutes Outlawing Yellow Dog Contracts, (1931) 17 Am.
B. A. J. 516, 518; McClintock, Minnesota Labor Disputes Injunction Act,
(1937) 21 MINNESOTA LAw REVIEW 619; Landis, Cases on Labor Law
(1934), Extracts from Senate's Rejection of the Nomination of Judge John
S. Parker as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of United States,
p. 141.
S 2A broad attitude was adopted by the Minnesota court in construing
the 1933 Act in Lichterman v. Laundry and Dry Cleaning Drivers Union,(1938) 204 Minn. 75, 282 N. W. 689, 283 N. W. 752.
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sota Labor Disputes Injunction Act has been the subject of
several cases.
V. CASES UNDER THE MINNESOTA LABOR DISPUTES INJUNC-
TION ACT OF 1933
In the first case involving consideration of the 1933 Act,
Jensen v. St. Paul Moving Picture Machine Operators Union No.
356,"' the court in an unilluminating per curiam opinion held
that no "labor dispute" existed within the terms of the act, and
therefore that the case was "outside the prohibition in regard to
the issuance of injunctions." In this case plaintiff theater owner
had employed a union operator under a contract with the defendant
union, but in violation of the contract plaintiff discharged the
union operator and operated the machine himself. As a result
defendants published circulars saying plaintiff was "unfair" and
picketed plaintiff's theater and continued so to picket during and
beyond the time which the contract was to run. A motion for
a temporary injunction made prior to the expiration of the con-
tract was denied, but after the contract had expired, the court
granted plaintiff's motion for a permanent injunction., On
appeal the order granting the permanent injunction was affirmed,
and the court held that after the expiration of the contract the
defendants had an adequate remedy at law in a cause of action
for damages for breach of the contract; that plaintiff had a right
to settle a claim for damages at law ;185 and that the statute could
not be sustained if it were construed to permit "compulsion" to
be brought to bear upon the plaintiff through picketing, bannering,
etc., to force a settlement of the cause of action. The court
further stated that since the controversy related to damages and
did not concern "terms or conditions of employment" there was
no "labor dispute" within section 12 (c).
In State v. Perry8 the defendants were strikers 8 7 and ban-
nered one Gustafson, a foreman, at his residence as being a "scab."
Defendants were found guilty of violating a municipal ordinance
against disorderly conduct. The court referred to the 1933 Act,
183(1935) 194 Minn. 58, 259 N. 'W. 811.
'
5 4The opinion stated that appellants had conceded that an injunction
would be proper if there had been no contract. Such concession appears to
have been made upon oral argument, since a contrary position was assumed
in the Appellant's Brief, p. 15.
'18 Does such a right in fact exist?
186(1936) 196 Minn. 481, 265 N. W. 302.
387A similar question had arisen six years earlier in State v. Zanker,
(1930) 179 Minn. 355, 229 N. W. 311.
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and held that it was not applicable since the question of the right
of pickets to be free from injunctions was not involved. The court
admonished the defendant, saying that industrial conflicts could not
be carried into private homes.
In Reid v. Independent Uniow of All Workers,""" the de-
fendant was held in contempt of court for the violation of an in-
junction, and as a defense claimed that the court -was without
jurisdiction to issue an injunction under the terms of the 1933
law, and that therefore the injunction was void. The majority
opinion rejected this argument, saying that in order for the 1933
Act to apply, it must be found that a "labor dispute" exists; that
in deciding this question the jurisdiction of the court is necessarily
invoked;11s that once invoked, jurisdiction includes the power to
make an erroneous decision; and that where as here the question
passed on is a mixed question of law and fact, the decision is not
subject to collateral attack in a proceeding for contempt.190 The
majority opinion suggested that under section 9 of the Act a
method of speedy appeal' 9 ' is provided, which amply protects the
interests of the party or parties enjoined.
In a concurring opinion' 92 Chief Justice Gallagher found
that on the facts, no labor dispute existed. The case arose out of
the fact that the defendant union tried to force the plaintiff beauty
shop owner to charge certain prices for services, since the wages
of its employees were dependent thereon, being largely on a com-
mission basis. It was said that this was an attempt to fix prices
and was illegal. 19'
"83(1937) 200 Minn. 599, 275 N. W. 300.
1"'Does this view of the majority opinion indicate that the Minnesota
court will construe the 1933 Act as not depriving the court of jurisdiction,
and thus eliminate the objection raised to the Washington Act in Blanchard
v. Golden Age Brewing Co., (1936) 188 Wash. 396, 63 P. (2d) 397?
190 In (1938) 47 Yale L. J. 1136, the Reid Case is criticized, and it is
pointed out that unless collateral attack is allowed, the courts can vitiate
the anti-injunction acts by merely refusing to recognize a particular con-
troversy to be a "labor dispute." This criticism itself seems unwarranted
insofar as it is based on the premise that the courts will deliberately attempt
to avoid the anti-injunction acts.
It'The provision even as to speedy appeal (Mason's Minn. Stat., 1940
Supp., sec. 4260-9), by the terms of the Act itself would seem to apply only
where the court had found a "labor dispute" to exist. Here no such "labor
dispute" was found, and yet the court would seem to allow a "speedy appeal."
Although this is illogical it seems to answer the criticism made in (1938) 47
Yale L. J. 1136, mentioned supra, note 190.
102Loring, J., concurring, also agreed with the majority opinion ex-
pressed by Stone, J.
193Compare Lichterman v. Laundry and Dry Cleaning Drivers Union,
infra, pp. 788, 789.
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In a vigorous dissent Justice Peterson asserted that a labor
dispute existed here, although there was no dispute between an
employer and employees, and that since the Act applied the court
was required to make certain findings of fact as a prerequisite
to the granting of an injunction,"' 4 and since this was not done, the
court was without jurisdiction. This fact, appearing on the face
of the record, made it subject to collateral attack. 9" The dissent
disagreed with the majority opinion and found the question of
whether a labor dispute existed to be a question of law, and
therefore subject to collateral attack.
The question of what constitutes a "labor dispute" within the
meaning of section 12 was finally raised directly in Lichternan v.
Laundry and Dry Cleaning Drivers Union.98 In that case the
plaintiff launderers refused to agree to a price list adopted pur-
suant to the Unfair Trade Practice Act,.'97 and as a result the
salary of plaintiff's employees was reduced. Defendants caused
plaintiff's establishment to be picketed, and although no con-
troversy was found to exist between plaintiff and his em-
ployees, the court found a "labor dispute" to exist on the basis
that the dispute was between "persons who are engaged in the
same occupation" as set out in section 12, subsections (a) and
(b). The court further indicated that the statute would be satis-
fied if the parties had an indirect interest in the controversy. The
question of constitutionality was not raised in the case, since
the parties had stipulated that if no labor dispute were found
the plaintiff would be entitled to an injunction, but that if such
a labor dispute were found to exist then no injunction should
issue.
The court speaking through Mr. Justice Stone, did not men-
tion the position taken by Chief justice Gallagher in the Reid
Case,:'" and held that although the defendants could not dictate
194So held in Lauf v. Shinner, (1938) 303 U. S. 323. 58 Sup. Ct. 578,
82 L. Ed. 872.
'
9 The dissent also argued that the existence of a "labor dispute" was a
question of law, and not a mixed question of law and fact, and therefore
was capable of being collaterally attacked.
196(1938) 204 Minn. 75, 282 N. NV. 689, 283 N. W. 752, discussed in
(1939) 23 MINNESOTA LAW REvIEW 549.
197Minnesota Laws 1937, ch. 116, Mason's Minn. Stat., 1940 Supp., secs.
3976-37 to 3976-49. See footnote 193, and also footnote 198.
'91"In its final analysis the only issue between the plaintiff and the
defendant union and its officers pertained to the rates plaintiff must charge
her customers for services rendered. That was clearly a price fixing require-
ment and illegal." The court in Lichterman v. Laundry and Dry Cleaning
Drivers Union, (1938) 204 Minn. 75, 282 N. W. 689, clearly indicated that
it was not deciding the legality of price fixing agreements or the validity
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prices to be charged by plaintiff, they had a "manifest interest in
opposing a manner of doing business . . . which threatens their
own security as to status or wages." In concluding, the court
assumed a broad-minded attitude toward the problem of labor
controversies, and pointed out that laws such as the one in ques-
tion were intended as "aids to a greater degree of economic security
and social order," and that to the extent that both capital and
labor recognize the rights of the other will the interests of indus-
trial democracy be advanced. 9
The issuance of a temporary restraining order as allowed under
the provisions of section 7 (e) of the 1933 Act was perhaps tacitly
accepted by the Minnesota court in American Gas Machine Co. v.
Voorhees.2' Defendants had engaged in a sit-down strike, plain-
tiff had brought suit for an injunction and damages, and the court
had issued a temporary restraining order upon the filing of a bond
by the plaintiff pursuant to the above provision in the statute.
Later the parties agreed to dismiss the entire proceeding, each
releasing the other of any claims it may have. Upon dismissal of
the action defendant made a motion for an order assessing dam-
ages under section 7 (e), and from a denial of this motion, de-
fendant appealed. The court, in affirming the order of the trial
court, clearly pointed out that under this section a recovery is
predicated on an "erroneous or improvident" issuing of a tem-
porary restraining order, and that no such finding of fact is per-
missible where, as here, the parties merely agreed to a dismissal,
since such dismissal only serves to show the fact of discontinuance
and not the plaintiff's right to the restraining order. Assuming
that damages were awarded for the improvident or erroneous
issuance of a temporary restraining order, it is still likely that this
remedy would be inadequate.
2 0 1
of the 1937 Unfair Trade Practice Act (Minn. Laws 1937, ch. 116, Mason's
Minn. Stat., 1940 Supp., secs. 3976-37 to 3976-49).
lDThis would seem to dispel any of the fears voiced by Mr. Justice
Peterson in his dissent in Reid v. Independent Union of All Workers, (1937)
200 Minn. 599, 275 N. W. 300. Cf. comments in (1939) 23 MINNESOTA
LAW RmvEw 853; (1937) 35 Mich. L. Rev. 340; (1935) 33 Mich. L.
Rev. 777.
200(1938) 204 Minn. 209, 283 N. W. 114. No question of constitution-
ality of this section was raised.
2OlThe result of the wrongful issuance of a temporary restraining order
has already been pointed out, supra, p. 761. Furthermore, even an
award of damages as allowed under section 7 (e), Mason's Minn. Stat., 1940
Supp., sec. 4260-7 (e), may be inadequate, since it is difficult to measure
the probable damages caused by an improperly frustrated strike. Moreover
it has been pointed out in McClintock, The Minnesota Labor Disputes In-
junction Act, (1937) 21 MINNEsoTA LAW REvIEw 619, 620, that even the
ten day limit on the duration of a restraining order may be defeated in
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In State v. Cooper 2 2 the question of the right to picket a
private residence was raised again. The defendant had been hired
to picket and banner a private home in a residential district, the
owner of the house having discharged a chauffeur employed by
him for several years. The defendant was convicted of violation
of a municipal ordinance against disorderly conduct, and on appeal
three of the six justices sitting found that the evidence was suffi-
cient to sustain such a conviction, and further that the 1933 Act,
especially section 4 (e), did not apply-no labor dispute being
involved within the terms of the statute, since "labor disputes" as
used in the statute meant industrial disputes.
In a concurring opinion by Chikf Justice Gallagher, in which Mr.
Justice Stone also concurred, it was urged that no labor dispute
existed on the basis of the record, and that therefore the right of a
person to picket a private home should not have been decided.
The concurring opinion agreed that the conviction on the basis of
the municipal ordinance was proper.
In a dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Peterson disagreed, claim-
ing that there was no breach of the peace or disorderly conduct
shown by the evidence, and that the conviction was therefore im-
proper. The dissent also contended that under section 4 (e) the
right to picket peacefully is protected from injunction even when
it involves a private residence,20 3 and further that such legislation
recognizes the lawfulness of the conduct which it exempts from
injunctional restraint.2 14
The result reached by the majority opinion may be justified
as a proper limit beyond which disputes between an employer
and an employee can not be carried. Assuming this for the
moment, the fact still remains that the court may have erred in
sustaining the conviction as to disorderly conduct, since here the
evidence showed that no commotion or disturbance had been
caused by the defendant, and in this respect the case is essentially
different from both State v. Perry and State v. Zanker, a fact
pointed out by the dissent. Second, it would seem that the three
operation where the hearing on the motion for the temporary injunction has
been begun within the ten days but continues thereafter.202(Minn. 1939) 285 N. W. 903, discussed in (1939) 24 IMfINNESOTA
LAw R-viEW 132.
203The dissent relied on Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, (1937)
301 U. S. 468, 57 Sup. Ct. 857, 81 L. Ed. 1229.
2O4This position also seems to have been taken by the three other jus-
tices, (1939) 24 MINNESoTA LAw RFvlEw 132, see supra, footnote 136. For
criticism, see Fraenkel, One Hundred and Fifty Years of the Bill of Rights,
(1939) 23 MINEsoTA LAw REviEw 719, 769.
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justices need not have treated the matter of the application of the
Labor Disputes Injunction Act of 1933,205 since by the very terms
of the Act it serves only as a limit on the jurisdiction of the court
to grant injunctive relief, while here the action was a criminal
charge based on disorderly conduct.
The dissent, it is submitted, was correct in its interpretation as
to the right to enjoin the peaceful picketing of a residence under
the Minnesota law, 2 0 both by common law rules and under the
1933 Act, and in this case under the municipal ordinance. But
to the extent that the dissent based its result on an application
of the 1933 Act to the particular facts of the present case, it would
seem incorrect inasmuch as the proceeding was not a suit for an
injunction but a criminal action based on disorderly conduct.
In looking back on the Labor Disputes Injunction Act as con-
strued by the Minnesota court, it is not possible to be very certain
of what injunctive inmunity the 1933 Act has succeeded in
granting organized labor. Dictum in the Lichternwn Case indi-
cates a receptive attitude on the part of the court toward such labor
legislation, and the court recognized that it is a sound approach to
the establishment of a greater degree of social and economic
security. The decision in that case would also seem to eliminate
any fears as to the construction of the Act which may have been
raised by the opinion in the Jensen Case. The opinion of the three
justices in State v. Cooper rieed not be regarded as hostility on the
part of the court to the 1933 Act, since it may well be limited to
its facts, in which case the major source of true labor controversies
would be unaffected.
A comparison of the previous decisions in Minnesota based on
common law principles with the 1933 Labor Disputes Injunction
Act may well prove instructive as to the extent to which the 1933
law has changed the rights of labor in pursuing its purposes.
The question of the legality of boycotts20 7 as defined in the
Gray Case20 would seem to be unaffected.20  It would certainly
20 5-Cf. State v. Perry, (1936) 196 Minn. 481, 265 N. W. 302. See
supra, pp. 786, 787.20GNothing in the 1933 Act can be construed to limit its application to
industrial disputes, and the definition given to "labor disputes" in section 12(Mason's Minn. Stat., 1940 Supp., sec. 4260-12) is broad enough to include
disputes involving a domestic servant and his employer, (1939) 24 MINNE-
sOTA LA-w REviEW 132. A clear legislative expression on this point would
be desirable.207The Wisconsin law (see footnote 115) expressly declares that secon-
dary boycotts are not made lawful.2 0 3Gray v. Building Trades Council, (1903) 91 Minn. 171, 97 N. W.
663, 1118.
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seem that section 4 (e) could not be given the effect of allowing
any such pressure to be exerted on neutral third persons, nor would
subsections (g), (h), or (i) have this effect, since they refer
back to the previous subsections, which certainly cannot be con-
strued to sustain any such argument. Also it would seem that if
any labor controversy were to satisfy the requirements of being
an unlawful act, or causing irreparable injury, etc., necessary to
the granting of an injunction as set out in section 7, it would
clearly be a boycott as defined in the Gray Case. On this basis it
may safely be said that the rule2 " laid down in the Gray Case is
still binding law in Minnesota today.
It is obvious that subsections (a), (e), (g), (h), and (i) of
section 4 are merely declaratory of the rules laid down in the
Grant Case.21 ' By subsection (e) the rule of the Steffes Case-1 -
seems to be reiterated in an equally uncertain form. In regard to
the right of a union to enforce one of its rules with the consequent
injury to an employer or potential employer, the rule of the Scott-
Stafford Case213 could easily be the basis for section 4, subsections
(a), (g), (h), and (i).
Violent and intimidating activities on the part of labor, even
when done in pursuance of a legitimate purpose -2 14 have always
been subject to injunction. The soundness of such a position by
the courts is recognized in section 4, subsections (e) and (i), which
exclude the acts set forth in the respective subdivisions from
injunctional exemption if done with fraud or violence. Also in
section 7 (a), unlawful acts committed or threatened, when accom-
panied by the conditions set out in subsections (b), (c), (d), and
(e) therein, are the basis for an injunction.
In two situations however it would appear that the 1933 Act,
assuming it to be constitutional, has effected important changes.
As previously pointed out, by section 3 the legislature has attempted
OsMcClintock, The Minnesota Labor Disputes Injunction Act, (1937)
21 MiNNESOTA LAw RE viEw 619, 639-640.21oSee supra, pp. 761, 762. It is to be remembered that the court allowed
a peaceful notification to the plaintiff's customers that the plaintiff was
"unfair," which seems to be substantially section 4 (e) of Mason's Minn.
Stat., 1940 Supp., sec. 4260-4 (e), and also allowed defendants to enter
projects where its members were at work and notify and persuade them to
cease work, which is a substantial embodiment of subsections (a), (h),
and (i), of section 4 (Mason's Minn. Stat., 1940 Supp., sec. 4260-4).
21"Supra, pp. 763-5.212Supra, pp. 765-6.
21$Supra, p. 763.214Minnesota Stove Co. v. Cavanaugh, (1915) 131 Minn. 458, 155
N. W. 638, supra, p. 771.
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to avoid the result produced by State v. Daniels, and has declared
yellow dog contracts unenforceable.
Of more practical importance today is the question of the
right of the owner of a business to work at his own occupation.
The Minnesota court, in the Roraback Case, indicated by strong
language the fundamental nature of such a right. In the Campbell
Case an attempt so to limit an owner's right to work was found by
both the majority and the dissenting opinions to be unlawful under
the common law, 215 and by the majority to be a violation of the
anti-trust statute. This situation would clearly involve a labor
dispute -2 10 within section 12 of the 1933 Act, and by section 4 (e)
this fact may properly be given publicity if it is done in a peaceful
manner. Also by section 8 the scope of the injunction is narrowed,
and it may prohibit only the specific acts complained of in the com-
plaint.
In general it would seem that the 1933 Labor Disputes Injunc-
tion Act has effected no such radical changes as was at first feared
by some employers.
VI. THE MINNESOTA LABOR RELATIONS ACT OF 1939
By far the most comprehensive attempt to regulate industrial
disputes ever undertaken by the Minnesota legislature was made
with the recent passage of the Minnesota Labor Relations Act in
1939. After defining such ambiguous words as employee,11 7 labor
dispute, -15 strike,210 and others, the Act in section 2 establishes a
department of conciliation under the direction of a permanent
220
215The justices differed in their interpretation of the facts, and also as
to the proper scope of the injunction. See supra, pp. 767-771.2 2 McClintock, Minnesota Labor Disputes Injunction Act, (1937) 21
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEw 619, 640. Cf. Thompson v. Boekeout, (1937) 273
N. Y. 390, 7 N. E. (2d) 674, where the court held no labor dispute to exist
within the state anti-injunction act (see footnote 162), on similar facts, but
granted permission to maintain one picket on the basis of common law rules.217Minnesota Laws 1939, ch. 440, p. 777, sec. 1 (c); Mason's Minn.
Stat., 1940 Supp., sec. 4254-21 (c)-includes one whose work has ceased
because of an "unfair labor practice" set out in section 12, and who has not
received other regular and substantially equivalent employment.218Vinnesota Laws 1939, ch. 440, p. 777, sec. 1 (f), Mason's Minn. Stat.,
1940 Supp., sec. 4254-21 (f)-is nearly identical with Mason's Minn. Stat.,
1940 Supp., sec. 4260-12 (c).
-°1Minnesota Laws 1939, ch. 440, p. 777, sec. 1 (g), Mason's Minn.
Stat., 1940 Supp., sec. 4254-21 (g)--"the temporary stoppage of work by
the concerted action of two or more employees as a result of a labor dispute
as herein defined." There can be no one-man strike. Att'y Gen. Oct. 18,
1939. The defining of a strike, when left to the courts, often has resulted in
limiting the activities of labor. Note, (1935) 84 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 771;
Note, (1927) 40 Harv. L. Rev. 896, 900.22 The previous provision for temporary arbitration and conciliation,
Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 4046-4. is expressly repealed by sec. 20 of
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officer called the labor conciliator, and requires the conciliator to
adopt "reasonable and proper rules and regulations relative to and
regulating the conduct of such hearings."
' 22 1
By section 6, both the employer and the labor organization or
representative are required to give notice to the other party of any
intended change in the working agreement, etc.; and upon the
giving of such notice, a duty on the parties to attempt a peaceable
settlement is created; and if after ten days this has failed, a strike
or lockout may be called, provided notice to that effect is given
both the other party and the conciliator ten days in advance. The
giving of this notice creates a duty on the conciliator to try to
settle the dispute. If the dispute is in a business affected with
a "public interest,"22 2 under section 7 a commission of three may
be appointed by the governor, and the period postponing the
beginning of a strike or lockout is increased.
Provision is also made for voluntary22 3 arbitration. Employees
are declared to have the right of self-organization 2 4 and the right
to bargain collectively through agents of their own choosing, and
also the right to refrain from such activities.
In section 11 certain unfair labor practices for employees and
labor organizations are set out, and by section 12 certain corre-
sponding acts of employers are declared to be unfair labor prac-
tices. In a subsection to each,2 25 some of the unfair practices are
the 1939 Act (Minn. Laws 1939, ch. 440, sec. 20, Mason's Minn. Stat., 1940
Supp., sec. 4254-40).
22'Minnesota Laws 1939, ch. 440, sec. 5, Mason's Minn. Stat., 1940
Supp., sec. 4254-25.
222The question of public interest arose in connection with the Kansas
Court of Industrial Relations in Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial
Relations of State of Kansas, (1923) 262 U. S. 522, 43 Sup. Ct. 630, 67 L.
Ed. 1130; (1925) 267 U. S. 552, 45 Sup. Ct. 441, 69 L. Ed. 785; Dorchy v.
Kansas, (1923) 264 U. S. 286, 44 Sup. Ct. 323, 68 L. Ed. 686. See discus-
sion in Young, Industrial Courts, (1920-1) 5 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 39,
185, 353.
223Minnesota, Laws 1939, ch. 440, sec. 9, Mason's Minn. Stat., 1940
Supp., sec. 4254-29. Compare the provision for the Kansas Industrial Court,
held to violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment as an
interference with the employer's freedom of contract, in Wolff Packing Co.
v. Court of Industrial Relations of State of Kansas, (1923) 262 U. S. 522,
43 Sup. Ct. 630, 67 L. Ed. 1103. The previous provision for arbitration in
Minnesota was contained in Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., secs. 9513-19. By
Minn. Laws 1939, ch. 439, Mason's Minn. Stat., 1940 Supp., sec. 9513, sec.
9513 was amended so as to include "labor disputes" as defined in the Min-
nesota Labor Relations Act.
224Cf. Mason's Minn. Stat., 1940 Stpp., sec. 4260-2.
2 Minnesota, Laws 1939, ch. 440, sec. 11 (h), sec. 12 (g), Mason's
Minn. Stat., 1940 Supp., sees. 4254-31 (h), 4254-32 (g).
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also declared to be unlawful acts. In section 13, certain additional
acts are declared to be unlawful.
The injunction is specifically treated in sections 14 and 15,
the first section allowing an injunction to issue against any unfair
labor practice, as long as certain procedural requirements as to
hearings, witnesses, cross-examination, etc., be met and expressly
making inapplicable in such situations the 1933 Labor Disputes
Injunction Act as well as the main provisions of the 1917 Act.226
By section 15 the right to maintain an injunction of an employee,
labor organization, or employer who has violated any provision
of the 1939 Act is also upheld if a certain further requirement be
met.2 7  Collective bargaining, the procedure therefore, and the
choosing of appropriate units, etc., are provided for.228
Since the use of an injunction depends to a large extent upon
the finding of an unfair labor practice, it is necessary to treat
sections 11 and 12 in more detail; furthermore, invalidity of any
specific unfair labor practice provision will reinstate to that extent
the previous Minnesota law as affected by the 1933 Labor Dis-
putes Injunction Act.
It is an unfair labor practice although not an unlawful act 229
"for any employee or labor organization to institute a strike if the
calling of such strike is a violation of any valid collective agree-
ment between any employer and his employees or labor organiza-
tion and the employer is, at the time, in good faith complying with
the provisions in the agreement.11
2
1
Although collective bargaining agreements are not made enforce-
able as a contract by this provision,2 3 1 and although the-question of
the validity of such bargaining agreements never has been passed
on by the Minnesota court, it would seem that the persuasive
226Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., secs. 4256-60. It will be noted that sec.
4255 is unaffected.227 innesota, Laws 1939, ch. 440, sec. 15, Mason's Minn. Stat., 1940
Supp., sec. 4254-35, requiring the party in good faith to have used all the
possible means provided for by law to make a peaceable settlement of the
dispute.
-
28Minnesota, Laws 1939, ch. 440, sec. 16, Mason's Minn. Stat., 1940
Supp., sec. 4254-36.22OMinnesota, Laws 1939, ch. 440, sec. 11 (a), Mason's Minn. Stat., 1940
Supp., sec. 4254-31 (a). This is the only employee unfair labor practice
enumerated in section 11 which is not also an unlawful act under sub-
section (h).
22OMinnesota, Laws 1939, ch. 440, sec. 11 (a), Mason's Minn. Stat., 1940
Supp., sec. 4254-31 (a).231The only remedy available for the enforcement of such agreements by
the Act is that of injunction as permitted by section 14, since by section
11 (h), a violation of s~etion 11 (a) is not an unlawful act. Furthermore
there is no express provision in the Act allowing damages for the breach of
such agreement.
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authority of decisions in other states2 2 holding such agreements
valid, and the general desirability 23 3 and urgency 234 of holding such
agreements valid would be given effect by the Minnesota court, at
least to the extent of allowing an injunction2 3 to prevent its breach.
It must also be remembered that "neither the common law, nor the
fourteenth amendment, confers the absolute right to strike. '23
0
It is both an unfair labor practice and an unlawful act for any
employee or labor organization to institute a strike in violation of
the sections 3 7 providing for: (a) peaceable settlement of labor
disputes between the parties, (b) giving of notice of intent to call
a strike or lockout, and (c) providing for conciliation.2 38 Although
the problem does not appear to have been much considered, the
effect of issuing an injunction against the improper calling of a
strike in either of the above mentioned situations constituting unfair
labor practices may well involve a violation of the thirteenth
amendment as being involuntary servitude 39 in so far as such an
232Enforced as valid on the behalf of the employer: Barnes & Co. v.
Berry, (C.C. Ohio 1907) 156 Fed. 72; Meltzer v. Kaminer, (1927) 131
Misc. Rep. 813, 227 N. Y. S. 459. Union allowed to enjoin the breach of a
bargaining agreement by the employer: Schlesinger. v. Quinto, (1922) 201
App. Div. 487, 194 N. Y. S. 401; Goldman v. Cohen, (1928) 202 App. Div.
631, 227 N. Y. S. 311; Weber v. Nasser, (1930) 210 Cal. 607, 286 Pac.
1074, discussed in (1930) 15 MINNESOTA. LAW REVIEW 251.233Garrison, The National Railroad Adjustment Board, (1937) 46 Yale
L. J. 567, 592. "234Riesenfeld, Recent Development; in French Labor Law, (1939) 23
MINNESoTA LAW REvEw 407, 444-5, where the writer suggests: "It might
well be that on the success of collective bargaining is hinged the fate of
industrial democracy and democracy in general."235 Assuming that the Act made possible a civil action for damages for
violation of a collective bargaining agreement, it still appears that the remedy
would be inadequate for two reasons: (1) The general rule in Minnesota is
that an unincorporated association cannot be sued as such even under Mason's
1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 9180, allowing suit under a common name in certain
cases, St. Paul Typothetae v. St. Paul Book Binders Union, (1905) 94 Minn.
351, 102 N. W. 725, discussed in (1929) 14 MINNEsoTA LAW REVIEW 193,
unless it is also engaged in business in the group name. Fitzpatrick v. Inter-
national Typographical Union of North America, (1921) 149 Minn. 401,
184 N. W. 17. (2) Even if the union were engaged in a business so as to
be capable of being sued as aft entity, the damages would ,be hard to ascer-
tain, McClintock, Equity (1936) 62, 63, even if it be further granted that
the union were solvent.
And where the remedy at law is inadequate, an injunction is properly
issued, Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 9386; McClintock, Adequacy of In-
effective Remedy at Law, (1931) 16 MINNESOTA LAW REviEW 233, 255.22 86Dorchy v. Kansas, (1923) 272 U. S. 306, 47 Sup. Ct. 86, 71 L. Ed.
248. 2 37Minnesota, Laws 1939, ch. 440, secs. 6 and 7, Mason's Minn. Stat.,
1940 Supp., secs. 4254-26-7.2 3 8Minnesota, Laws 1939, ch. 440, sec. 11 (b), Mason's Minn. Stat., 1940
Supp., sec. 4254-31 (b). See discussion in the note, (1940) 24 MINESOTA
LAW REVIEW 217.2 3 9McClintock, Equity (1936) 101; Op. Att'y Gen. March 23, 1939:
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injunction against a strike would amount to ordering the striking
employees 2'10 back to work. Yet as a practical matter it has been
recognized that an employee has the right to quit work,2 41 and
that no court decree can effectively force an employee to return
to work.242 Probably for this reason the courts have rarely en-
joined a strike as such, even if called for an obviously unlawful
purpose, but rather usually have framed their injunctions in terms
to prohibit the paying of any strike benefits243 by the union, the
giving of support 24 4 by the labor organization to the strike, or the
enjoining of picketing in general. The court could probably also
frame its injunction in the alternative of forcing the strikers either
to return to work or to quit. With such injunctions being issued
by the courts, the problem of involuntary servitude resulting from
section 14 when applied to section 11, subsections (a) and (b),
is not very acute. It may be added that under the latter an in-
junction or temporary restraining order could be issued to prevent
the calling of a strike (or lockout) within the ten day period for
conciliation if such an act appeared imminent and if the relief
could be had in time.
Although the sit-down strike has never arisen before the
Minnesota supreme court, two distinct attacks 245 are made by
the statute against this weapon of labor so as to dispel any future
doubts. Most courts24 6 have agreed that such activities by labor
Arthur v. Oakes, (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1894) 63 Fed. 310, 317, 25 L. R. A. 414;
Wakeman v. Barker, (1889) 82 Cal. 46, 22 Pac. 1131; Beatty v. Chicago
B. & Q. Ry. Co., (1936) 49 Wyo. 22, 52 P. (2d) 404--dictum that to force
employees to perform the contract "would trench too closely to involuntary
servitude...240Minnesota, Laws 1939, ch. 440, sec. 1 (c), Mason's Minn. Stat., 1940
Supp., sec. 4254-21 (c)--employees retain this status even though striking
because of a current labor dispute, if no other substantial employment is
obtained.241Mason's Minn. Stat., 1940 Supp., sec. 4260-4 (a) ; Arthur v. Oakes,
(C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1894) 63 Fed. 310, 317, 25 L. R. A. 414.242Op. Att'y Gen., March 23, 1939.243The prohibition against such an injunction in Mason's Minn. Stat.,
1940 Supp., sec. 4260-4 (c), as well as Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 4257,
is inapplicable by Minn. Laws 1939, ch. 440, sec. 14, Mason's Minn. Stat.,
1940 Supp., sec. 4254-34, when injunction is sought against an "unfair labor
practice."244The same is true of Mason's Minn. Stat., 1940 Supp., secs. 4260-4(d) and (h).
245Minnesota, Laws 1939, ch. 377, ch. 440, sec. 11 (c), Mason's Minn.
Stat., 1940 Supp., sec. 4254-31 (c). No provision as to sit-down strikes was
included in the 1933 Act (Minnesota Labor Disputes Injunctions Act).2460hio Leather Co. v. De Chant, (1937) 8 Ohio Opinions 31, 24 Ohio
L. Abs. 187; Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1937) 90 F.(2d) 155; Warm, The Judicial Attitudes Toward Trade Unions, (1939) 23
MiNNESOTA LAw REVIEw 255, 272-3.
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are unlawful, but still the question remains whether an injunction
should be allowed, in view of the fact that the injunction probably
could not be enforced effectively at any event.2 47
By the Minnesota Labqr Relations Act the controversial ques-
tion of the right of labor' to picket is divided into two classes:
first, where a strike is in progress, and second, where no strike
is in progress. In section 11 (d) 24 8 the right to picket where a
strike is in progress has many possibilities: (a) If only employees
picket, there appears to be no limit on the number allowed,2 4 nor
does the right to picket seem to depend upon the lawfulness of the
purpose of the strike. (b) If employees picket, non-employees
may also picket as long as they remain in the minority. (c) If no
employees picket 2 0 despite the -act that there is a strike in
progress, then non-employees cannot picket at all. It is obvious
that this section does not prohibit picketing by an employee, and
by necessary implication allows even non-employees to picket
within the above mentioned limits. The validity of such a regula-
tion has been urged,2 51 and it would seem that such a position is
sound when based on the police power.
25 2
The right to picket in Minnesota never has been confined to
situations where a strike was in progress." 2 By section 11 (e)
2
.
471cClintock, Injunctions Against Sit-Down Strikes, (1938) 23 Iowa
L. Rev. 149.24
8"It shall be an unfair labor practice: "For any person to picket or
cause to be picketed a place of employment of which place said person is not
an employee while a strike is in progress affecting said place of employment,
unless the majority of persons engaged in picketing said place of employ-
ment at said times are employees of said place of employment."249By section 13 of Minn. Laws 1939, ch. 440, Mason's Minn. Stat., 1940
Supp., sec. 4254-33, it is possible that an unreasonable number of pickets
could be held to be unlawful either as "interfering with the free and un-
interrupted use of the roads," etc., or as obstructing wrongfully "ingress to
and egress from any place of business or employment." In Mason's Minn.
Stat., 1940 Supp., sec. 4260-4 (e), there was also no limit placed on the
number of pickets. As a practical matter, no case arising before the Minne-
sota Supreme Court where picketing was sustained has involved the use of
more than one picket.250A strike may be in progress without picketing, (1927) 40 Harv.
L. Rev. 896.2
-
5 Note, (1940) 24 MINNESoTA LAW REVIEW 217.252In People v. Harris, (Colo. 1939) 91 P. (2d) 989, the court said that
a regulation but not a prohibition of picketing is valid. In (1939) 88 U. of
Pa. L. Rev. 118, it is suggested that a law distinguishing the rights of
employees and non-employees to picket is reasonable as tending to lessen
possible violence. And in (1938) 48 Yale L. J. 308, it is pointed out that
although the right to picket is said to be guaranteed by the constitutional
grant of freedom of speech, Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, (1937)
301 U. S. 468, 57 Sup. Ct. 857, 81 L. Ed. 1229, still this right can be limited
by the police power, and it is only necessary that the law enacted have
reasonable relationship to the purpose of preventing violence.253Steffes v. Motion Picture Machine Operators Union, (1917) 136
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this common law rule is protected against infringement with no
practical2 4 limit being placed on the right despite the fact that
the picketing in such situations is limited to one picket.2 55  Of
course such legislative declaration of the right to picket although
no strike exists will be given effect. 25 6  Although it is obviously
the law25 7 in Minnesota, nothing in the 1939 Act expressly re-
quires the picketing to be peaceful.2 5 8  Quaere whether picketing
can be enjoined if a violation of section 11, subsection (a) or (b),
is found, assuming the picketing is otherwise within the limits
of subsections (d) and (e)?
It is both an unfair labor practice and an unlawful act to
interfere with a vehicle or its operator if neither the owner nor
operator is a party to a strike.25 0 It is probable that such a result
would be reached by the court in the absence of the above provi-
sion,200 yet such an act is properly enjoinable, not only since the
remedy is more immediate but also because damages other than
physical damages to the operator or to the vehicle would be hard
to ascertain.
In section 11 (g), it is provided that no employee or labor
organization or officer shall compel or attempt to compel any
person to join or not to join a certain labor organization or take
part in a strike, by any "unlawful interference" with him, his
family, or his property. Such acts are both unfair labor prac-
tices and unlawful. This subsection is broader than the previous
subsection,26 1 but the finding of a violation is likewise a question
of fact for the particular case.2 12  On the basis of both the common
Minn. 200, 161 N. W. 524; Mason's Minn. Stat., 1940 Supp., see. 4260-4 (e) ;
also sec. 12 as applied in Lichterman v. Laundry and Dry Cleaning Drivers
Union, (1938) 204 Minn. 75, 282 N. W. 689.2 54See footnote 249.255Minnesota, Laws 1939, ch. 440, sec. 11 (e), Mason's Minn. Stat., 1940
Supp., sec. 4254-31 (e), provides that it is an unfair labor practice: "For
more than one person to picket or cause to be picketed a single entrance
to any place of employment where no strike is in progress at the time."25GSenn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, (1937) 301 U. S. 468, 57
Sup. Ct. 857, 81 L. Ed. 1229; Lauf v. Shinner, (1938) 303 U. S. 323, 58
Sup. Ct. 578, 82 L. Ed. 872.
257,Minnesota Stove Co. v. Cavanaugh, (1915) 131 Minn. 458, 155
N. W. 638.2
-
1Minnesota, Laws 1939, ch. 440, see. 13, Mason's Minn. Stat., 1940
Supp., see. 4254-33, may perhaps be used by the court as a basis so to hold.
Compare also footnote 249.
"
2
'Minnesota, Laws 1939, ch. 440, sec. 11 (f), Mason's Minn. Stat., 1940
Supp.. see. 4254-31 (f).
2-05Hanson v. Hall. (1938) 202 Minn. 381, 279 N. W. 227. See footnote
61. Nothing in the 1933 Act (.%fason's Minn. Stat., 1940 Supp., sees. 4260-1
to 4260-15). would protect such acts from injunction.2 Op. Att'y Gen., Aug. 11, 1939.2620p. Att'y Gen., Aug. 11. 1939.
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law2 63 and previous statutes,2 64 the granting of an injunction in
such a situation is both valid and justifiable.
A violation of any of these subsections under section 11 with
the exception of subsection (a), being an unlawful act, also has
certain additional effects.265
In section 12 certain unfair labor practices for employers are
set out, which also by subsection (g) are declared to be unlawful
acts with two specific exceptions. 2 6  Subsections (a) and (b)
correspond to those under section 11 as to the employee or labor
organization, and prohibit the institution of a lockout in violation
of a collective bargaining agreement or in violation of the provi-
sions set out in sections 6 and 7 of the Act. Under the same
reasoning as applied to the employees' unfair labor practices, the
validity of these subsections cannot be doubted.
In subsection (c) a familiar provision is found.267 A further
check on the power of the employer to intimidate labor through
fear of the loss of jobs is provided for by subsection (d) whereby
an injunction 8 is permitted against an employer for discharging
or discriminating against an employee because he has signed any
affidavit or petition or given testimony under the Act. Spying
on activities of employees in the exercise of their legal rights
may also be enjoined by subsection (e). A blacklist of any em-
ployee because he has exercised any legal right, for the 'purpose
of preventing him from gaining employment is enjoinable as an
unfair labor practice, and also subjects the employer to civil
damages and criminal prosecution as being an unlawful act. "09
The result of this provision is to add the remedy of injunction
263Minnesota Stove Co. v. Cavanaugh, (1915) 131 Minn. 458, 155
N. W. 638.284Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 10431-(1) ; Mason's Minn. Stat., 1940
Supp., sec. 4260-2. Compare also Minn. Laws 1939, ch. 440, sec. 10 (a),
Mason's Minn. Stat., 1940 Supp., sec. 4254-30 (a).
26sMinnesota, Laws 1939, ch. 440, sec. 11 (h), Mason's Minn. Stat.,
1940 Supp., sec. 4254-31 (h). See discussion in Note, (1940) 24 MINNESOTA
LAW Ravizw 217.
26oMinnesota, Laws 1939, ch. 440, secs. 12 (a) and 12 (c), Mason's
Minn. Stat, 1940 Supp., sec. 4254-32 (a) and (c) are omitted from sec.
12 (g).
267This is a ban against yellow dog contracts, and should be connected
with State v. Daniels, (1912) 118 Minn. 155, 136 N. W. 584, and with
Mason's Minn. Stat., 1940 Supp., sec. 4260-3, which never has been passed
on in Minnesota to date.
268SThis is enjoinable as an "unfair labor practice" under sec. 14, and
by sec. 12 (g) is also an unlawful act.
26-Minnesota, Laws 1939, ch. 440, sec. 12 (f) and (g), Mason's Minn.
Stat., 1940 Supp., sec. 4254-32 (f) and (g). See Note, (1940) 24 MINNE-
SoTA LAW Ravirw 217.
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where under a previous statute2 70 only the remedy of damages was
possible.
Section 13 makes it unlawful to (a) "interfere with the free
and uninterrupted use of" roads, streets, etc., and (b) "to wrong-
fully obstruct ingress to and egress from any place of business
or employment." Whether an injunction suit can be maintained
for a violation of this section as such is uncertain. 271
The specific sections dealing with injunctions in the Minnesota
Labor Relations Act of 1939 are sections 14 and 15. In the first
it is provided that where any "unfair labor practice" as defined
in sections 11 or 12 is threatened or committed, the district court
shall have jurisdiction to issue an injunction and further that in
such suits the provisions of the 1917 Act and the 1933 Labor
Disputes Injunctions Act shall not apply. The section further
provides that as to procedural requirements, no court shall have
jurisdiction to issue any temporary or permanent injunction unless
(1) a hearing272 in open court be had with witnesses supporting the
allegations in the affidavits and opporttinity for cross-examination
and testimony in opposition thereto, and unless (2) a finding of
fact 213 be made that the acts set out in sections 11 and 12 have
been committed or will be committed unless restrained. Where
a temporary restraining order is sought, it may not be issued
even if otherwise proper, unless upon the testimony of witnesses
in open court and upon a record being kept of such testimony.274
In section 15, provision for an injunction is specified in those
cases where the applicant, whether employer, employee, or labor
organization, has violated any of the provisions of the Act "with
respect to any labor dispute." Such applicant is not entitled to
any of the benefits2 75 of the Act respecting this labor dispute, and
270Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 10378. See footnote 13 and text.
271A violation of section 13 (Minn. Laws 1939, ch. 440, sec. 13),
Mason's Minn. Stat., 1940 Supp., sec. 4254-33, is clearly not an unfair labor
practice. It would seem that the issuance of an injunction under this section
would depend on whether the defendants in the particular case had exceeded
the limits allowable in giving "publicity to the facts of a strike' without
undue violence or fraud.272Compare similar provision in Mason's Minn. Stat., 1940 Supp., sec.
4260-7, paragraph 1.
2 73Compare Minnesota, Laws 1939, ch. 440, sec. 7 (a), Mason's Minn.
Stat., 1940 Supp., sec. 4254-27 (a), by which the scope of the injunction as to
persons who may be enjoined is more narrowly limited.
274By the 1933 Act (Mason's Minn. Stat., 1940 Supp., sec. 4260-7), it
was possible to get a temporary restraining order in certain cases even with-
out notice to the other party if a bond was filed. See supra p. 789.
2 T 5The only one apparent is that of being able to maintain an injunction
under section 14 (Minn. Laws 1939, ch. 440, sec. 14), Mason's Minn. Stat.,
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further is not entitled to maintain a suit for an injunction for any
matters arising out of such labor dispute until he has "in good
faith made use of all means available under the laws of the state
of Minnesota for the peaceable settlement of the dispute.
2 76
The effect of these two sections is, upon reflection, not as
destructive as first appears. If the applicant is within section 14,
his rights are still uncertain when the unfair labor practice com-
plained of is that of picketing, since by section 11 subsections (d)
and (e) it seems that picketing probably cannot be enjoined even
though the strike is in violation of subsections (a), (b), or (c),
as long as there is no violation of subsections (d) or (e). And as
pointed out before, an injunction would probably not be issued
against the strike as such, since it might involve involuntary
servitude. Thus the most effective use of the injunction, viz. to
enjoin picketing and thus end the strike seems unavailable in most
situations. Without this it seems that the only use which an in-
junction could have, assuming an unfair labor practice be found,
is to enjoin the paying of strike benefits or the giving of organized
backing to a strike.
Section 15 would certainly not increase the court's power to
grant an injunction, and since the available means of peaceable
settlement must first be utilized by the applicant, the time of the
granting of the injunction is deferred and with the lapse of time,
its effectiveness usually is decreased.
So it would appear that the actual result of the 1939 Act is to
set up certain procedural limits on the granting of injunctions in
cases involving labor disputes, and not as may at first have been
believed, to broaden the situations where the injunction may be
resorted to as a check upon the orga.nized activities of labor.
VI. SUMMARY
Before any statutory expression on the subject, it had been the
law in Minnesota that labor could organize and pursue its purposes,
if legitimate, by peaceful means,2 7 7 including picketing and banner-
ing of an employer as unfair as long as there was no implication of
1940 Supp., sec. 42-54-34, since the other provisions are in the form of re-
quirements imposed upon the parties by the law.
276This amounts to an insertion of tl:e requirement of arbitration which
was omitted from the Labor Disputes Injunction Act. See footnote 139.
Such a provision is desirable. Where it has not been complied with, at least
one court has found that under its anti-injunction act, it had no power to
issue an injunction. See supra, p. 783.
-
7 Gray v. Building Trades Council, (1903) 91 Minn. 171, 97 N. W. 663.
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threat or intimidation,2 78 and including the right to induce others
by peaceful persuasion270 to cease dealing with an employer with
whom a labor controversy existed. But a boycott was unlawful
and could be enjoined..28 0  Furthermore a union could enforce its
rules, if in a peaceful manner and without malice, notwithstanding
any consequential injuries to others.2 81  All these substantive
rights accorded labor prior to the Minnesota Labor Disputes In-
junction Act2 2 would remain unaffected even if the Act were
held invalid, which on the basis of recent decisions, 283 appears
unlikely. Neither would the Minnesota Labor Relations Act of
1939284 seem to effect any changes in this respect.
Yellow dog contracts are probably unenforceable on the basis
of present statutes, 28 ' although in the only case on the point, the
court in an early decision had taken a contrary position. Picketing
of a private residence seems prohibited as disorderly conduct,286
and would not seem to be within the restrictions on injunctions
provided by the 1933 Act.287  What result the 1939 Act would
have is uncertain.2 8 8  Whereas picketing could be enjoined prior
to the 1933 Act if for the purpose of preventing an owner from
278Gray v. Building Trades Council, (1903) 91 Minn. 171, 97 N. W.
663; Steffes v. Motion Picture Machine Operators Union, (1917) 136
Minn. 200, 161 N. W. 524.
279Grant Construction Co. v. St. Paul Building Trades Council, (1917)
136 Minn. 167, 161 N. W. 520, 1055.
28OGrant Construction Co. v. St Paul Building Trades Council, (1917)
136 Minn. 167, 161 N. W. 520, 1055; Gray v. Building Trades Council,
(1903) 91 Minn. 171, 97 N. W. 663.
2 13Scott Stafford Opera House Co. v. Minneapolis Musicians Associa-
tion, (1912) 118 Minn. 410, 136 N. W. 1092.
282Minesota, Laws 1933, ch. 416, Mason's Minn. Stat., 1940 Supp., secs.
4260-1 to 4260-15.
283Reid v. Independent Union of All Workers, (1937) 200 Minn. 599,
275 N. W. 300, see footnote 189; Lichterman v. Laundry and Dry Cleaning
Drivers Union, (1938) 204 Minn. 75, 282 N. W. 689, 283 N. W. 752; (1939)
23 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 549; State v. Cooper, (Minn. 1939) 285 N. W.
903, discussed in (1939) 24 MINNESOTA LAW REVIw 132.
284Minnesota, Laws 1939, ch. 440, p. 777, Mason's Minn. Stat., 1940
Supp., secs. 4254-21 to 4254-40.
28 2Minnesota, Laws 1939, ch. 440, p. 777, Mason's Minn. Stat., 1940
Supp., secs. 4254-21 to 4254-40; Mason's Minn. Stat., 1940 Supp., sec. 4260-3
(Minnesota Labor Disputes Injunction Act). Cf. State v. Daniels, (1912)
118 Minn. 155, 136 N. W. 584.
28 State v. Zanker, (1930) 179 Minn. 355, 229 N. W. 311.
sState v. Perry, (1936) 196 Minn. 481, 265 N. W. 302; State v.
Cooper, (Minn. 1939) 285 N. W. 903.28$Perhaps Minnesota, Laws 1939, ch. 440, sec. 11 (e), Mason's Minn.
Stat., 1940 Supp., sec. 4254-31 (e), may be construed to give a different
result.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
working at his own business, 2 9 under the 1933 Act2 90 a contrary
result is reached, which seems substantiated by the 1939 Act.
2
'
VII. CoNcL usioN
A labor dispute although nominally involving two parties, viz.
a labor organization and an employer, has also an important third
party, the general public. Most courts - 2 and legislatures29-2 have
recognized the fundamental conflict of interests between the two
competing parties; on the one hand that of the employee or labor
organization to make publicly known its quest for better wages,
hours, or working conditions in a particular dispute, and that of
the employer to be free to operate his own business as he sees fit,
and to be accorded both the legal aid especially the equitable pro-
tec'tion of the laws. But the interest of the most important party,
the general public in the community affected, has been for the
most part overlooked. The Minnesota legislature by the Minne-
sota Labor Relations Act of 193921 4 has taken an important step
toward this end in providing machinery for the peaceful settlement
of labor controversies. If the purpose of the legislature is given
effect by broad-minded cooperation of both labor and capital in
the operation of the Act, the labor injunction would properly
become that extraordinary form of relief accorded by equity where
the situation demands it, rather than a convenient weapon to be
used against the activities of organized labor.
2 5 Roraback v. Motion Picture Machine Operators Union, (1918) 140
Minn. 481, 168 N. W. 766; Campbell v. Motion Picture Machine Operators
Union, (1922) 151 Minn. 220, 186 N. W. 781.
29DOMinnesota, Laws 1933, ch. 416, sec. 4 (e), Mason's Minn. Stat. 1940
Supp., sec. 4260-4 (e).
29Minnesota, Laws 1939, ch. 440, sec. 11 (e), Mason's Minn. Stat.,
1940 Supp., sec. 4254-31 (e) ; see supra, pp. 798, 799.2 2Litchterman v. Laundry and Dry Cleaning Drivers Union, (1938)
204 Minn. 75, 282 N. W. 689, 283 N. W. 752; Senn v. Tile Layers Protec-
tive Union, (1937) 301 U. S. 468, 57 Sur.. Ct. 857, 81 L. Ed. 1229.
293The passage by the various state legislatures of anti-injunction acts
is based on a recognition of this conflict; see footnote 108.204Minnesota. Laws 1939, ch. 440, Mason's Minn. Stat., 1940 Supp., sec.
4254-21 to 4254-40.
